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2013 Supreme(Del) 1939

DELHI HIGH COURT
G.P.Mittal, J.
Madan Singh & Anr. - Appellant
Versus
Vee Pee International Pvt.Ltd. & Ors. - Resopndent
Crl. M.C. No. 2071 of 2012
Decided On : 06-03-2013

Advocates:
For the Petitioners: Mr. Rajesh Gupta, Adv. with Mr. Harpreet Singh, Adv.
For the Respondents: Mr. Ritesh Kumar Bhari, Adv. with Mr. Vinay Kumar Gupta, Adv. for R-1. Mr. K.K. Sharma, Adv. for R-2 to R-4. Ms. Jasbir Kaur, APP for the State.

The main legal point established in the judgment is the significance of unimpeachable evidence in determining the nature of a firm and the soundness of the defense, as well as the court's inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash criminal proceedings based on such evidence.

Headnote:

Section 138 - Quashing of Complaint - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - [Section 138] - [Summary of Acts and Sections: The court discussed the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and its application in the context of determining the nature of the firm involved in the case. The court also referred to the inherent powers of the court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and its application in quashing criminal proceedings based on sound and reasonable defense. The judgment highlighted the importance of unimpeachable evidence and its consideration in quashing criminal proceedings.]

Fact of the Case:

The Petitioners sought to quash a Complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, arguing that they were wrongly prosecuted as partners of a firm when in fact the firm was a Proprietorship Firm. The Respondent was uncertain about the nature of the firm in the Complaint, leading to a dispute over the firm's status.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the documents presented by the Petitioners, including those issued by government departments, indicated that the firm in question was a proprietorship firm. The court also emphasized the importance of unimpeachable evidence in determining the nature of the firm and the soundness of the defense.

Issues: The key issues included the nature of the firm involved in the case, the admissibility of documents to determine the firm's status, and the application of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in prosecuting the Petitioners.

Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on the unimpeachable nature of the documents presented by the Petitioners and the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 to quash the Complaint against the Petitioners.

Final Decision: The court quashed the orders and proceedings against the Petitioners in the Complaint Case based on the finding that the firm was a proprietorship firm and the prosecution of the Petitioners as partners was not permissible.

JUDGMENT :

G. P. Mittal, J.— (ORAL)

1. The Petitioners invoke the inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing of the Complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (the Act) on the premise that the Petitioners were sought to be prosecuted as Partners of M/s. Dhanlaxmi Fashion whereas infact M/s. Dhanlaxmi Fashion was a Proprietorship Firm. In fact, in the Complaint itself, the firm was prosecuted through its Proprietor/Partner and Respondent No.2 was prosecuted as Proprietor/Partner/Authorized signatory of M/s. Dhanlaxmi Fashion. Thus, although in the title of the Complaint, the Respondent was not sure whether the firm was a Partnership or Proprietorship firm. In Para 3 of the complaint it was averred that M/s. Dhanlaxmi Fashion was a Partnership firm and accused Nos. 2 to 5 were its partners and were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the day to day business of the firm. It was further stated that accused No.2 (not a Petitioner before this Court) was the signatory of the cheque in question and was also, therefore, liable to be prosecuted. Learned counsel for the Petitioners referring to the reply to the notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. served upon Respondent No.3, stated that M/s. Dhanlaxmi Fashion was a Proprietorship firm and his father Madan Singh and his younger brother Rajender Rajpurohit had nothing to do with the same and further that accused Bharat who was also prosecuted as partner of M/s. Dhanlaxmi Fashion was merely an employee who had left the job.

2. The learned counsel for the Respondents urges that a host of documents were placed before the Trial Court to prove that M/s. Dhanlaxmi Fashion was a proprietorship firm but the same were not taken into consideration. The learned counsel refers to a letter dated 26.10.2010 written by Respondent Mahender Singh Rajpurohit as Proprietor of M/s. Dhanlaxmi Fashion to his Banker, HDFC Bank, Johri Bazar, Jaipur whereby the payment of the cheque in question was stopped. He has placed on record a copy of the notice given by M/s. Dhanlaxmi Fashion to the Inspector of Shops and Commercial Establishments, whereby the Govt. department was notified that the shop will close on Sunday; the registration certificate of the shop M/s. Dhanlaxmi Fashion with the Inspector Shops and Commercial Establishments and the registration certificate issued to M/s. Dhanlaxmi Fashion by Commercial Taxes Officer, Division Kar Bhawan, Jahalana, Jaipur. In all these documents M/s. Dhanlaxmi Fashion has been described as a proprietorship firm.

3. Learned counsel for the Respondents opposes the Petition for quashing the complaint. Relying on Rajesh Agarwal & Ors. v. State & Ors. 2010 (3) JCC (NI) 273; and Krishna Murari Lal v IFCI Factors Ltd. 2013 (1) JCC (NI) 1 he urges that at this stage the averments made in the Complaint have to be accepted on its face value and the Petitioners’ defence, if any, cannot be considered at this stage.

4. Relying on Bhushan Kumar & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr., Criminal Appeal No.612/2012 decide on 04.04.2012, the learned counsel for the Respondents submits that while taking cognizance, a Magistrate is not expected to give any explicit reason. Referring to State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Pandhi, Criminal Appeal No.497/2001 decided on 29.11.2004, the learned counsel argues that the documents relied upon by the accused cannot be taken into consideration at the time of framing of the charge.

5. In the case of Rajesh Agarwal, a Coordinate Bench of this Court held that the provisions of summary trial enable the Respondent to lead defence evidence by way of an Affidavit and other documents, thus an accused who considers that he has a tenable defence and the case against him was not maintainable, he can enter his plea on the very first day of his appearance and file an Affidavit in his defence. It is also true that a Magistrate is not required to record detailed reasons while issuing process.
















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