The court emphasized the need to balance the rights of the parties while ensuring the effectiveness of the statutory appeal process under Section 29 of The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

1. Impugned order of 18th December, 2012 entertained petitioner’s appeal under Section 29 of The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 subject to deposit of arrears of maintenance, as granted by the trial court while permitting petitioner to deduct the amount of Rs. 92,000/- from the amount due. Appellate Court vide impugned order has directed the petitioner to convert the arrears of maintenance into two fixed deposit receipts of equal amount in the name of respondent-wife.

2. The challenge to the impugned order of 18th December, 2012 is on the ground that no pre-condition can be imposed for hearing a statutory appeal under Section 29 of The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. However, at the hearing learned senior counsel for petitioner had placed reliance upon Apex Court’s decision of 29th January, 2015 in Crl. M.P. No. 1577/2015 in Crl. Appeal No. 2070/2014 Shalu Ojha v. Prashant Ojha whereby time bound directions have been issued to the Appellate Court to hear the appeal under Section 29 of The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 on merits without any pre-condition.

3. During the course of hearing, attention of this Court was drawn to various interim orders passed by different Benches of this Court whereby statutory appeal under Section 29 of The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 have been directed to be heard upon deposit of 50% of the maintenance amount. It was submitted by learned senior counsel for petitioner that till date petitioner has already deposited a sum of Rs. 4,00,000/- and has no means to further deposit the highly inflated maintenance amount awarded by trial court and since substantial amount has been deposited by petitioner, therefore, Appellate Court be directed to hear petitioner’s statutory appeal without any further deposit.

4. Attention of this Court was drawn to Apex Court’s decision rendered on 18th September, 2014 in Crl. Appeal No. 2070/2014 Shalu Ojha v. Prashant Ojha 2014 SCC Online SC 734 to remind this Court that in proceedings under The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 the courts should be slow to grant interim orders. It was pointed out by learned counsel for respondent that arrears of maintenance till date are of Rs. 18,00,000/- and amount of Rs. 4,00,000/- only has been deposited by petitioner towards arrear of maintenance, which is kept in fixed deposit receipts and respondent is not permitted to withdraw it and thereby leaving respondent without any means of surviving.

5. It was submitted by learned counsel for respondent that Apex Court’s order of 29th January, 2015 in Shalu Ojha (Supra) relied upon by petitioner’s counsel is distinguishable, as in the aforesaid case, the husband was in custody due to inability to pay the maintenance amount and in that background, Apex Court had directed hearing of appeal on merits without any pre-condition. It was further pointed out that in the instant case, petitioner has means to pay the maintenance amount but is deliberately avoiding to do so and thereby driving respondent to penury. Reliance was placed upon Apex Court’s decision in Rajeev Preenja v. Sarika & ors. 159 (2009) DLT 616 and Nitin Gupta v. Ruchika Gupta 2012 (3)Crimes 227 (Del) to submit that the provision under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. are akin to the provisions of maintenance under The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and this special enactment has been brought to protect the women and children from neglect. Attention of this Court was also drawn to Sub-Rule (5) of Rule 6 of The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2006 which mandates that application under Section 12 of The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 shall be dealt with in the same manner as laid down in Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus, it was submitted by learned counsel for respondent that the dictum of decisions in Rajeev Preenja & Nitin Gupta (Supra) squarely