The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement for corroboration in cases based solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix in sexual assault cases.

S.P.Garg, J.

1. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment dated 27.05.2005 of learned Additional Sessions Judgment in Sessions Case No. 46/02 arising out of FIR No. 36/02 registered at Police Station Uttam Nagar by which the appellant Surender Kumar @ Shivender was held guilty for committing offence under Section 376 IPC. By an order dated 03.06.2005, he was awarded Rigorous Imprisonment for six and a half years with fine Rs. 20,000/- under Section 376 IPC.

2. Briefly stated the prosecution case, as projected in the charge-sheet, was that on 17.01.2002 at about 1:00 p.m. in the upper room situated on the first floor of House No. 144, Village Nawada, the appellant committed rape upon the prosecutrix ‘X’ (assumed name), aged around 30 years and criminally intimidated her. First Information Report was lodged after recording victim’s statement (Ex.PW-1/A). ‘X’ was medically examined. The accused was arrested; exhibits collected during investigation were sent for examination to Forensic Science Laboratory. Statements of the witnesses conversant with facts were recorded. Upon completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the appellant in the Court. The prosecution examined nine witnesses to establish its case. In 313 statement, the appellant pleaded false implication and denied his involvement in the crime. The trial resulted in his conviction as aforesaid under Section 376 IPC. It is relevant to note that the petitioner was acquitted of charge under charge 506 IPC and the State did not challenge it.

3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have examined the file. Appellant’s conviction is solely based upon the testimony of the prosecutrix ‘X’. Her statement has not corroborated from any other independent source. Settled position is that conviction can be based on sole testimony of the prosecutrix provided it lends assurance of her testimony. However, in case the court has reasons not to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may look for corroboration. In case, the evidence is read in its totality and the story projected by the prosecutrix is found to be improbable, the prosecutrix case becomes liable to be rejected.

4. In the instant case, nothing has surfaced as to at what time exactly, the prosecutrix was sexually assaulted. Police machinery was set in motion when information was conveyed about the commission of rape and quarrel recorded vide Daily Dairy (DD) No. 40-B (Ex.PW-7/A) at 06.10 p.m. on 17.01.2002. In her complaint (Ex.PW-1/A), the victim disclosed that she had gone to the appellant’s house at around 1:00 p.m. to play with his daughters. After some time, when the girls were busy in their work, the appellant called her in the upper room of the house. She was pushed on the cot and threatened of dire consequences. The accused committed rape upon her as a result of which she became unconscious. On regaining consciousness, she returned to her house wearing her clothes and narrated the occurrence to her sister-in-law (Meena).

5. In her Court statement as PW-1 ‘X’ made vital improvements and stated that she had gone to appellant’s house at around 10:00 a.m. to play with the girls. When she reached there, the accused asked other children to go out and pulled her inside the room. She again stated that the accused called her in a room on the upper portion of the house. When she went there, the accused bolted it from inside and made her lie on the cot. She could not resist as she was handicap; her left arm and leg were thin and weak. She got frightened and could not make noise. The accused, thereafter, committed rape upon her. After the rape incident, she went to her house and narrated her ordeal to her Bhabhi Meena. In the cross-examination, she was unable to remember the exact date of occurrence. She disclosed that five children were playing in the appellant’s house that time. She denied that she on her own had gone to the appellant’s room. She admitte