The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement for gaining actionable knowledge of the order passed by BIFR within the specified timeline for filing appeals under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985.

PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J.

1. The petitioner company M/s. Akay Organics Limited (hereinafter referred to as Akay) was incorporated on August 13, 1984 under the Companies Act 1956. The Company was promoted by two gentlemen namely :

(i) Mr.L.S.Pardasaney and

(ii) Mr.V.Swaminathan. Share holding of the two was 50.01 : 49.99, in favour of Mr.L.S.Pardasaney.

2. Akay started incurring heavy losses and on February 20, 1995 was declared a sick industrial company by BIFR and IRBI was appointed as an operating agency to examine the viability of Akay and if possible submit a scheme of rehabilitation.

3. Conscious of the fact that a scheme for rehabilitation could result in a reduction of the interest or rights of the share holders, Mr.L.S.Pardasaney and Mr.V.Swaminathan participated in the proceedings before BIFR. Last attendance before the BIFR by Mr.V.Swaminathan was at the hearing held on July 21, 2001. Thereafter he stopped taking any interest in the affairs of Akay including rehabilitation thereof. Mr.L.S.Pardasaney interacted with the operating agency and other stakeholders. He ensured representation before BIFR. Proceedings before BIFR dragged on. On April 08, 2013 BIFR sanctioned a scheme for rehabilitation which envisaged existing equity to be written down by 99% and fresh capital infused by the promoters. Needless to state, there were other ameliorative measures in the scheme. The quasi-judicial order dated April 08, 2013 was given a formal shape on May 24, 2013.

4. On December 19, 2013 Mr.V.Swaminathan applied for a certified copy of the order dated May 24, 2013 which was received by him on January 23, 2014 and the appeal was filed before the AAIFR on January 27, 2014. It was registered as Appeal No.59/2014, challenging the scheme for rehabilitation which was sanctioned. He challenged the order dated May 24, 2013. Notice being issued in the appeal Mr.L.S.Pardasaney questioned the maintainability of the appeal with reference to it challenging the order dated May 24, 2013. He urged that the scheme had been sanctioned on April 08, 2013 and it was said order which could have been challenged. The technical objection was turned down by AAIFR vide order dated November 17, 2014 observing that the practice of BIFR was to follow up an order sanctioning a scheme by issuing a formal separate order which was distinct from the first and though the first order, sanctioning the scheme, found its reflection in the second order, the second order was the one which formally sanctioned the scheme. Thus, as per AAIFR, the order dated April 08, 2013 merged in the order dated May 24, 2013.

5. Mr. L.S. Pardasaney did not immediately challenge the order dated November 17, 2014.

6. He waited for the second objection taken by him to be decided concerning limitation.

7. As per Section 25 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 an appeal has to be preferred to AAIFR against an order passed by BIFR within 45 days. As per the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 25, upon being satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time, if appeal is filed within 60 days the same can be entertained.

8. Since certified copy of the order passed by BIFR which is challenged before AAIFR has to be annexed with the appeal, various judicial pronouncements, (noted in para 4 of the impugned order dated May 26, 2015) passed by AAIFR have held that the aggrieved person has to apply for certified copy of the order passed by BIFR within the period of limitation and limitation would reckon from the date the person concerned had knowledge of the order passed by BIFR.

9. Take off point for considering limitation before the BIFR was the date on which Mr.L.S.Pardasaney acquired knowledge of the order dated May 24, 2013 passed by BIFR.

10. Since learned counsel for the parties before BIFR as also before this Court proceeded on the basis that limitation has to be reckoned with reference to the date of knowledge of