S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.

1. The petitioner’s grievance is that after being selected by the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), the Offer of Appointment initially extended to him was withdrawn by the impugned order dated 09.03.2015.

2. The petitioner had responded to an advertisement for filling up the post of Sub-Inspector in Delhi Police & Central Armed Police Force (CAPF) as well as the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector in CISF. He participated in the recruitment process and qualified in all tests. In their final result declared in April 2014, he was shown to have been selected for the post of Sub-Inspector in the CISF. A letter of Appointment was issued to him dated 19.09.2014. The petitioner had disclosed at the relevant stage in the recruitment process that he had been in the past implicated in a criminal case and had been alleged to have committed offences punishable under Sections 323/324/325/326/506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). At the same time, he had stated that the criminal charges ended in acquittal on 01.06.2011 by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Kurukshetra, Haryana. By the impugned order -issued on 09.03.2015-the CISF withdrew the Offer of Appointment in the light of its existing policy and guidelines issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs on 01.02.2012.

3. Learned counsel submits that the impugned order is arbitrary. He relies upon the judgment of this Court in Sandeep Singh vs. Union of India & Ors in W.P.(C) No. 1029/2014 and submits that the Court had in somewhat identical circumstances where the candidate’s criminal case had ended in acquittal, directed that the offer of appointment withdrawn by the public employer should be quashed. The Court had, in the said judgment, taken note of the guidelines applicable to the CISF. The Court observed as follows:-

“8. While examining a case in terms of the provisions of the Policy/Guidelines dated 1st February, 2012 for considering cases of candidates for appointment in CAPFs against whom criminal cases were pending, this Court was of the view that a candidate who had been finally acquitted or discharged by a Court, he would not be entitled to the benefit of the proviso thereto to Clause 2(V) of the said policy if (i) the acquittal is on account of extension of benefit of doubt; and (ii) the acquittal rests on witnesses who have turned hostile due to fear or reprisal. Therefore ultimately, the judgment of acquittal would have to be examined. In that case (Mintu Mistri v. UOI & Ors., WP(C) 1530/2012, decided on 20.09.2012), this Court held that the noting of the Trial Court that the accused deserves to be acquitted under the “canopy of benefit of doubt” would be meaningless and is really otiose if the sum and substance of the said order rests on the fact that there was no evidence at all before the Court. The Court found that there was nothing on record which could suggest or manifest any element of fear or reprisal on the part of the witnesses when they appeared before the Trial Court. Accordingly, the withdrawal of the provisional offer of appointment in that case was set aside.”

4. It was emphasized that in the present case too, the most important witness i.e. the informant/complainant had failed to identify the accused i.e. the petitioner. In these circumstances it is contended that the ratio of the decision in Sandeep Singh (supra) squarely applies and the withdrawal of the offer of appointment was arbitrary. It was also highlighted that besides the same, the circumstance that the complainant had turned hostile, did not automatically imply that he was afraid of reprisal. Counsel submitted that in case the witness resiled from his own testimony, the Courts would be within its right to indict such individuals for perjury or other such like proceedings.

5. Counsel for the respondents urge that there are policy/guidelines with regard to whether to continue an offer of appointment issued after the culmination of the selection proces