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2016 Supreme(Del) 2208
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
P.S. TEJI, J.
SURRENDER KUMAR MEHRA – Petitioner
Versus
STATE & ANR. – Respondents
CRL. REV. P. 668/2015
Decided On : 13-06-2016
For the Petitioner: Mr. Tarun Arora, Adv.
For the Respondent: Mr. Izhar Ahmad, APP.
The main legal point established is that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should be based on glaring defects in procedure or manifest errors on points of law, and that enhancement of punishment should be justified and not arbitrary.
Headnote:
N.I. Act - Loan Repayment - Section 138 N.I. Act, 1881 - [Section 138 N.I. Act, 1881] - The court discussed the liability of the petitioner to repay the loan amount, the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, and the error in enhancing the punishment by the Appellate Court.
Fact of the Case:
A complaint case was filed by the respondent before the Trial Court, alleging that the petitioner failed to repay a friendly loan of Rs.5 lakhs, resulting in a dishonoured cheque and subsequent legal notice. The Trial Court convicted the petitioner under Section 138 N.I. Act, 1881.
Finding of the Court:
The Court upheld the conviction of the petitioner but set aside the enhanced punishment by the Appellate Court, directing the petitioner to pay the original compensation amount and upholding the Trial Court's order on sentence.
Issues: The issues revolved around the liability to repay the loan, the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, and the error in enhancing the punishment by the Appellate Court.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court found that the petitioner's liability to repay the loan was established, and the Appellate Court's enhancement of punishment was unjustified.
Final Decision: The Court set aside the enhanced punishment by the Appellate Court and upheld the Trial Court's order on sentence, directing the petitioner to pay the original compensation amount.
Certainly. Here are the key points from the provided legal document:
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The revision petition was filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code, challenging the orders passed by the lower courts regarding the conviction and sentencing of the petitioner (!) .
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The case involved a complaint for a dishonoured cheque issued in relation to a friendly loan of Rs.5 lakhs, which was allegedly not repaid by the petitioner. The cheque was dishonoured twice, and legal notice was issued, leading to criminal proceedings (!) .
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The Trial Court convicted the petitioner under the relevant section of the Negotiable Instruments Act and sentenced him to pay compensation, with a default imprisonment clause. The appellate court upheld the conviction but increased the compensation amount and the default imprisonment period (!) .
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The petitioner argued that the courts below mechanically passed orders without proper judicial consideration, and that the respondent failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. It was also contended that the amount of loan proved was less than Rs.5 lakhs, and thus, the liability was not established as per the cheque amount (!) .
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The courts below found that the respondent proved his case beyond reasonable doubt and that the petitioner was liable to repay the loan. The revisional court emphasized that its jurisdiction should be exercised only in cases of glaring procedural defects or manifest legal errors, and not to reappreciate evidence or interfere with concurrent findings (!) .
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The appellate court's enhancement of the compensation amount and default imprisonment was considered an error, as there was no appeal or contention by the respondent for such enhancement. The revisional court found that the order on conviction was based on cogent evidence, but the enhancement of punishment was unjustified (!) .
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Consequently, the revisional court set aside the appellate court's order on the quantum of punishment and upheld the original sentence passed by the trial court. The petitioner was granted liberty to pay the original compensation amount by a specified date and was directed to surrender for default of payment (!) .
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The stay granted earlier was vacated, and the petitioner was directed to comply with the payment and surrender requirements within the stipulated timeframe (!) .
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The revision petition and associated applications were disposed of accordingly (!) .
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P.S. TEJI, J.
1. The present revision petition has been filed under Section 397 and 401 of Cr.P.C, 1973 for setting aside the order passed by the Appellate Court vide order dated 17.09.2015 in Crl.Appeal No.08/2015 upholding the order passed by the Trial Court vide order dated 11.03.2015.
2. The brief facts of the case are that a complaint case No.33/1/12 was filed by the respondent No.2 before the Trial Court on the ground that he had advanced a friendly loan of Rs.5 lakhs to the petitioner in two installments viz. one amounting to Rs.3 lakhs on 12.11.2008 and other amounting to Rs.2 lakhs in January, 2009. The loan was to be repaid within a period of six months from the date of advancement of loan. After expiry of the said period, the petitioner tendered a cheque bearing No.146362 dated 15.09.2009 for an amount of Rs.5 lakhs, Ex CW1/1, which on presentment on 16.11.2009, was dishonoured with the remarks “Insufficient Funds” vide return memo dated 16.11.2009 Ex.CW1/2. Subsequently, at the request of the petitioner, the cheque was again presented, but it was again dishonoured with the same remarks on 23.12.2009 vide cheque returning memo Ex.CW1/3. Thus, the respondent No.2 issued legal notice dated 29.12.2009 Ex.CW1/4, which was duly served upon the petitioner.
3. The Trial Court after following due process of law, convicted the petitioner under Section 138 N.I. Act, 1881 and sentenced the petitioner to pay compensation of Rs.5,50,000/- to the respondent No.2 and in default to undergo imprisonment for one year vide impugned judgment dated 11.03.2015 and order on sentence dated 25.03.2015. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed an appeal which was also dismissed vide order dated 17.09.2015 wherein the order dated 23.03.2015 was modified to the extent that the petitioner was directed to pay compensation of Rs.6 lakhs within one month from the date of the order and in default to undergo 18 months’ imprisonment. Hence, the present petition.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record.
5. Argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Trial Court has mechanically passed the impugned order without application of judicial mind. It was further argued that the respondent No.2/complainant has failed to prove his case before the courts below beyond reasonable doubt. It was further argued that the Trial Court failed to appreciate that the petitioner had succeeded in bringing on record his defence with regard to the complainant giving alleged loan of Rs.5,00,000/- to the petitioner and if for the sake of arguments, it is assumed that the complainant had extended a loan to the petitioner, admittedly as per his own cross examination, he extended a loan of Rs.4,70,000/- and not Rs.5,00,000/- thereby meaning that there was no alleged liability existed to the tune of cheque amount as on date of the alleged insurance of cheque.
6. With respect to the liability of the petitioner/accused to repay the loan amount to the respondent No.2/complainant is concerned, there is a concurrent finding on the questions of fact by the courts below that the respondent No.2/complainant has proved his case beyond reasonable doubt and the same does not require to be gone into by this Court. In State of A.P. v. Pituhuk Sreeinvanasa Rao, (2000) 9 SCC 537 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court in upsetting concurrent finding of the facts cannot be accepted when it was without any reference, to the evidence on record or to the finding entered by the trial court and appellate court regarding the evidence in view of the fact that revisional jurisdiction is basically supervisory in nature.
7. The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is to be exercised when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law resulting in a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Else, it is not open to the High Court to interfere wi
