The main legal point established is that employment disputes falling under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 should be adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal.

1. It is the petitioner’s case that he was removed from service with the respondent bank by an order dated 26.07.2002 where he was working as clerk since 1979. On 15.11.1990, an audit was carried out at the Amar Colony Branch of the bank and irregularities were detected regarding grant of loans and overdrafts etc. Proceedings were not initiated against any officer except for two clerks including the petitioner and the Branch Manager, who was subsequently dismissed from service. It is the petitioner’s case that he was lowest in the hierarchy of persons working in the bank. The Branch Manager was heading the Bank and he was assisted by other officers such as, the Assistant Manager and the Field Officer.

2. The petitioner further submits that he did not and could not have had any role in the sanctioning of any loan or over-draft; that since he was a clerk, he could at best, have moved files from one desk to the other and had no role in the financial decision making process. The petitioner contends that he himself did not file any of the documents because the loans which were sanctioned, were of third parties who were relatives or acquaintances of other staff members of the said branch. The petitioner submits that vide order dated 19.11.2010 in the CBI Case No.18/2008, spanning over two decades, he has finally been discharged of any wrong doing. He was not found guilty of forging any document apropos the charges levelled against him. He submits that insofar as no document was ever filed or submitted by him towards sanction of any loan, he could not have been held guilty of any wrong doing as he was never part of the decision making process for sanction of either loan or over-draft.

3. He further submits that Rule 19.6(e) of Bipartite Settlement (in short the ‘settlement’) dated 19.10.1966 on the basis of which he was discharged was not available to the disciplinary authority because the said settlement though signed in 1966 was made effective apropos banks only on 10.04.2002; that his discharge under Rule 19.6(e) of the Settlement, effective from 10.04.2002, is an erroneous application of the said provision, that the said Rule only provides for the punishment of the guilty employee by bringing down his/her scale upto a maximum of two stages but it does not provide for dismissal or discharge from service; that although the impugned order cites the misconduct, yet it discharges him under the aforesaid Rule.

4. Mr. Rajiv Kapur, the learned counsel for the respondents, submits that citing the wrong Rule would not take away the substance of the order, because the other Rule permitted the action taken by the respondent. Therefore, the impugned order ought to be read as discharge under Rule 19.6(d) of the Settlement. The learned counsel for the respondent raises an issue of maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner, who was a clerk in the respondent bank, would be a workman and, therefore, his remedy would lie under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the I.D. Act). He submits that the petitioner never held a managerial position.

5. The petitioner submits that this issue of maintainability is raised for the first time after a lapse of 14 years. He refers to order of the Division Bench dated 06.09.1995 passed in WP(C) No. 405/ 1995, passed in the petitioner’s case itself, which held inter alia:

“...... This writ petition can be disposed of at this stage as now the only question addressed before us is as to from what sage of the proceedings, the de novo enquiry should commence. A new enquiry officer has been appointed vide impugned order and impugned order has ordered de novo enquiry which, according to our view, was not justified. The reason given for holding the enquiry is that petitioner’s grievance that he had not been given proper opportunity for defending his case by leading documentary and oral evidence has been accepted by the Department ad for affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to th