1. The appellant instituted a suit for recovery of Rs.3,94,754/- against the respondent under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure before the District Judge, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts in which the summons were issued to the respondent on 5th November, 2011.

2. On 2nd September, 2013, the appellant failed to appear before the Trial Court whereupon the Trial Court dismissed the appellant’s suit in default.

3. On 6th September, 2014, the appellant filed an application for restoration of the suit on the ground that there was a lapse on the part of the appellant’s counsel. It was submitted that the appellant enquired from his previous counsel on 1st September, 2014 and thereafter, enquired from the Court and came to know of the dismissal of the suit. The appellant thereafter engaged a new counsel, who inspected the record on 4th September, 2014 and thereafter filed the application for restoration.

4. Vide order dated 6th October, 2015, learned Trial Court dismissed the restoration application holding that there was no sufficient cause for condonation of delay in seeking the restoration.

5. The law with respect to condonation of delay is well settled. While dealing with applications seeking condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act, the approach has to be liberal and judicious guided by the paramount consideration of not depriving a litigant ordinarily of adjudication of rights on merits. Hypertechnical, too strict, and pedantic approach may cause injustice that has to be avoided.

6. In Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, [1955] 2 SCR 1, the Supreme Court held that the Code of procedure is designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it.

7. In Jai Jai Ram Manoharlal v. National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon, [1970] 1 SCR 22, the Supreme Court held that the rules of procedure are intended to be a handmaid to the administration of justice and party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the rules of procedure.

8. In Union of India v. Ram Charan (Deceased), [1964] 3 SCR 467, the Supreme Court observed that the provisions of the Code are with a view to advance the cause of justice. Of course, the Court, in considering whether the appellant has established sufficient cause for his not continuing the suit in time or for not applying for the setting aside of the abatement within time, need not be over-strict in expecting such proof of the suggested cause as it would accept for holding certain fact established, both because the question does not relate to the merits of the dispute between the parties and because if the abatement is set aside, the merits of the dispute can be determined while, if the abatement is not set aside, the appellant is deprived of proving his claim on account of his culpable negligence or lack of vigilance.

9. In Bhag Singh v. Major Daljit Singh, 1987 SCC (Supp) (1) 685, reiterating the law laid down earlier by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Ram Charan, (supra) the Supreme Court held that the Court while considering an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act will consider the facts and circumstances not for taking too strict and pedantic stand which will cause injustice but to consider it from the point of taking a view which will advance the cause of justice.

10. In G. Ramegowda v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, AIR 1988 SC 897, the Supreme Court observed that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in pref