Important Point – An interlocutory order only decides a particular aspect or a particular issue or a particular matter in a proceeding, suit or trial but does not conclude trial at all.

I.S. MEHTA, J.

1. The instant petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is preferred by the petitioner against the impugned order dated 23.08.2014 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge Cum Special Judge-II, CBI Rohini Courts: Delhi in criminal revision No. 25/14 wherein the learned ASJ disposed of the petition directing against the order dated 24.05.2014 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate in complaint case No. 1555/1/12 titled as Ms. Sunita Mittal vs. Dilip Kumar @ Raju & Ors.

2. The brief facts stated are that Ms. Sunita Mittal present respondent/complainant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 on 08.08.2012 qua against Dilip Kumar the present petitioner and two other persons, i.e. Iqbal Chand and Vicky Kumar.

3. The basis of the complaint under Section 138 NI Act was that the petitioner had issued six post dated cheques in favour of the respondent in furtherance of the loan agreement dated 24.10.2011 for Rs. 1,43,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore Forty Three Lacs Only). However, the said cheques were dishonoured on presentation. Thereafter the respondent issued legal demand notices dated 14.07.2012 to the petitioner and when the petitioner failed to repay the loan amount within 15 days notice period it led to the filing of a complaint case under Section 138 NI Act before the Court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, (N-W), Rohini, Delhi.

4. On the basis of the documents available on record the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, (N/W)/Rohini Courts, Delhi took cognizance of the case and issued notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. against the petitioner vide order dated 16.02.2013.

5. During the trial proceedings the respondent/complainant (CW-1) was cross-examined by the counsel for the petitioner and several questions were asked from her one of which related to the income tax returns (ITRs). Consequently, the learned MM deferred the further cross-examination of the respondent/complainant for want of ITRs for the period 2005-2006 to 2011-2012 vide order dated 24.05.2014 in C.C. No. 1555/1/12.

6. Aggrieved by the said order dated 24.05.2014 the respondent/complainant filed a revision petition under Section 397 Cr.P.C. before the Court of District Judge(North-West), Rohini Courts, Delhi and vide order dated 23.08.2014 the learned Additional Sessions Judge Cum Special Judge-II, CBI Rohini Courts, Delhi passed the impugned order wherein the learned ASJ allowed the revision petition by setting aside the order dated 24.05.2014 with the appropriate direction to the learned MM to afford further opportunity for cross-examination to the petitioner/accused in which the learned MM would allow only those relevant questions confined to repayment of the loan by the petitioner/accused.

Hence the present petition.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the respondent/complainant had filed a complaint under Section 138 N.I. Act and when the respondent/complainant was in the witness box, the petitioner had cross examined the witness pertaining to the income tax records to which the respondent/complainant was unable to explain for want of document of income tax records and the Court below granted permission to the petitioner to put the question and directed the respondent/complainant to produce the income tax records on the next date of hearing vide order dated 24.05.2014.

8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the said order dated 24.05.2014 passed in favour of the petitioner was challenged by the respondent/complainant before the Court of Sessions and the learned ASJ allowed the said revision petition vide impugned order dated 23.08.2014.

9. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the cross-examination already conducted has been deleted by the Sessions Court and the scope of further cross-examination has been made very limited to the extent of repayment which should not have been done. It is further submitted that the legal no