2017 Supreme(Del) 449
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
S. MURALIDHAR, J.
SIDHI INDUSTRIES & ORS – Petitioners
Versus
RELIGARE FINVEST LIMITED – Respondent
O.M.P. (COMM) 6 of 2015
Decided On : 08-02-2017
For the Petitioner: Mr. Ashish Virmani, Mr. Akshay Abrol
For the Respondents: Mr. Ajay Uppal
The lack of authority to initiate arbitration proceedings was a curable defect, and the waiver of right to object under Section 4(b) of the Act influenced the court's decision.
Headnote:
Arbitration - Impugned Award - Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 - [Section 4(b), Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996] - The court discussed the challenge to the impugned award, the authority to initiate arbitration proceedings, the time limit for pronouncement of the award, and the improper stamping of the Loan Agreement. The court referred to relevant legal provisions and their interpretations, including the waiver of right to object under Section 4(b) of the Act, and distinguished previous judgments to support its decision.
Fact of the Case:
The Petitioners challenged the impugned award on grounds related to the authority to initiate arbitration proceedings, the time limit for pronouncement of the award, and the improper stamping of the Loan Agreement. The Respondent argued that the Petitioners had acquiesced in the arbitration proceedings and that the grounds were raised for the first time in the present petition.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the lack of authority to initiate arbitration proceedings was a curable defect, as per the Supreme Court's decision in United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar. It also held that the Petitioners had waived their right to object to the continuation of the arbitration proceedings beyond the stipulated time limit, as per Section 4(b) of the Act. The court dismissed the petition, finding that none of the grounds under Section 34 of the Act stood attracted.
Issues: The issues involved the authority to initiate arbitration proceedings, the time limit for pronouncement of the award, and the improper stamping of the Loan Agreement.
Ratio Decidendi: The lack of authority to initiate arbitration proceedings was a curable defect, and the Petitioners had waived their right to object to the continuation of the arbitration proceedings beyond the stipulated time limit. The court also emphasized that the grounds raised were for the first time in the present petition.
Final Decision: The petition was dismissed with no order as to costs.
1. Mr. Ashish Virmani, learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that the challenge to the impugned award dated 30th August, 2014 passed by the learned sole Arbitrator is essentially on the following grounds:
(i) The claim petition was signed by one Ms. Megha Gulati who was not authorized by the Respondent to initiate arbitration proceedings or file claims since the power of attorney (‘POA’) dated 19th April, 2012 placed on record did not expressly authorize her to do so;
(ii) the arbitration clause in the Loan Agreement (LA) mandated that the Arbitrator appointed by the Respondent should, unless an extension was consented to by the parties, conclude the arbitration proceedings and pronounce an Award within two months from the date of entering upon reference. It is pointed out that the Arbitrator entered upon reference on 27th September, 2013. Therefore, he ought to have pronounced the Award by 26th November, 2013. On the other hand, the learned Arbitrator pronounced the Award only on 30th August, 2014. Reliance is placed by learned counsel for the Petitioner on the decisions of the Supreme Court in NBCC Limited v. J.G. Engineering Private Limited (2010) 2 SCC 385 and Bharat Oman Refineries Limited v. M/s. Mantech Consultants (2012) 2 Arb.LR 482 (DB) (Bom).
(iii) The learned Arbitrator could not have proceeded with the arbitration since the LA containing the arbitration clause was not properly stamped.
2. In reply to the above arguments, it is pointed out by Mr. Ajay Uppal, learned counsel for Respondent, that by not objecting to the continuation of the arbitration proceedings beyond 26th November 2013, the Petitioners had in fact acquiesced in it and cannot be now heard to object. Reference is made to Section 4 (b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 („Act?). It is pointed out that a reply was filed by the Petitioners in the arbitration proceedings on 31st March, 2014 i.e., much beyond the stipulated date of completion of the arbitration proceedings. Thereafter, they participated in the final arguments of the arbitration proceedings on 25th July, 2014 and the Award was reserved.
3. It is further pointed out by Mr. Uppal that both NBCC Limited v. J.G. Engineering Private Limited (supra) and Bharat Oman Refineries Limited v. M/s. Mantech Consultants (supra) turned on their peculiar facts and are distinguishable. As regards the POA not authorizing Ms. Megha Gulati to institute the arbitration proceedings, attention has been drawn to the latter dated 14th August 2012 whereby the Respondent ratified the action of Ms. Megha Gulati initiating the arbitration proceedings, after noticing that the POA did not clearly authorize her to do so. In any event, it is submitted that this is a curable defect as held by the Supreme Court in United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar (1996) 6 SCC 660. As regards the insufficient stamping of the LA, it is submitted by Mr. Uppal that no such ground was urged before the learned Arbitrator. It has been raised for the first time in the present petition under Section 34 of the Act.
4. Further, Mr. Uppal pointed out that on merits the Petitioner did not have any case at all since, admittedly, the fact of their borrowing a loan and defaulting in making payment of the equal monthly instalments (EMIs) has not been denied by them.
5. As regards the first issue concerning the POA, while learned counsel for the Petitioner is right in pointing out that the POA dated 19th April, 2012 does not expressly authorise Ms. Gulati to institute arbitration proceedings by filing a statement of claims, the lack of the authority to do so has been acknowledged by the Respondent's letter dated 14th August, 2012. Although Mr. Virmani pointed out that the said letter was not placed on record before the learned Arbitrator, the Court finds that no plea as regards the lack of authority of Ms. Gulati was raised before the Arbitrator. Mr. Virmani referred to the Petitioners' written submissions before the learned Arbitrator w