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2017 Supreme(Del) 2915

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
MUKESH NIGAM & ANR. - Petitioners
Versus
ARUN KUMAR KHANDELWAL & ORS. - Respondents
RC.REV. 370/2017
Decided On : 18-08-2017

Advocates Appeared:
For the Petitioner: Mr. Ravinder Tyagi, Ms. Kanishka Tyagi, Ms. Divya Singhal and Ms. Kartika Tyagi, Advs.
For the Respondent: Mr. Peeyush Pahuja, Adv.

The judgment establishes the application of the principle of accretion to the tenancy premises and the grounds for eviction under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

Headnote:

Rent Control Revision Petition - Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, Section 25B(8) - Summary of Acts and Sections: The judgment discusses the application of Section 108(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and its interpretation in relation to the principle of accretion to the tenancy premises. It also highlights the provisions of Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, regarding the grounds for eviction and the requirement of the premises for the landlord's own residence.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioners sought leave to defend a petition for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. The court considered the ownership of the premises, unauthorised construction, bona fide requirement of the landlords, and non-payment of rent as key aspects of the case.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the petitioners were not entitled to leave to defend as no valid grounds were disclosed in their application. The court also emphasized that the construction above the tenancy premises formed part of the tenancy premises and that the landlords' requirement for their own residence was not negated by the petitioners' arguments.

Issues: Ownership, unauthorised construction, bona fide requirement of landlords, non-payment of rent

Ratio Decidendi: The court applied the principle of accretion to the tenancy premises under Section 108(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and emphasized the grounds for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

Final Decision: The petition was dismissed with no costs.

JUDGMENT :

CM No.29214/2017 (for exemption)

1. Allowed, subject to just exceptions.

2. The application is disposed of.

RC.REV. 370/2017 & CM No.29213/2017 (for stay)

3. This Rent Control Revision Petition under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 impugns the order [dated 1st June, 2017 in E No.270/2017 (New No.311/2017) of the Pilot Court (Central), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi] of dismissal of the application filed by the two petitioners Mukesh Nigam and Pramod Nigam for leave to defend the petition for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act filed by the nine respondents namely Arun Kumar Khandelwal, Rajeev Kumar Khandelwal, Sanjay Khandelwal, Sanjeev Kumar Khandelwal, Amit Khandelwal, Tarun Kumar Khandelwal, Akhil Kumar Khandelwal, Manju Khandelwal & Pradeep Kumar Khandelwal and the consequent order of eviction of the petitioners from first, second and third floors of House No.3752, Gali Loha Wali, Main Road, Chawri Bazar, Delhi-110006.

4. The counsel for the respondents appears on advance notice and the counsel for the petitioners has been heard.

5. The counsel for the petitioners/tenants, on enquiry, states that the petitioners/tenants do not controvert ownership of the respondents of the premises in the tenancy of the petitioners and the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondents on the one hand and the petitioners on the other hand.

6. It is however stated that one of the brothers of the two petitioners/tenants, who is also residing in the tenancy premises, has not been impleaded.

7. Petitioner No.1 in this petition is described as son of late Sh. Fateh Bahadur Nigam and the petitioner No.2 is described as son of late Sh. Dharampal Singh Nigam. It is stated that Sarajoo Nigam, another son of late Sh. Dharampal Singh Nigam, has not been impleaded.

8. From the record, it transpires that the premises were let out as far back as in the year 1940 to the grandfather of the present petitioners.

9. Merely because another heir has not been impleaded by the respondents/landlords in the petition for eviction, the same will not be detrimental or fatal to the maintainability of the petition for eviction. The law in this regard is settled by the Supreme Court as far back as in Surayya Begum Vs. Mohd. Usman (1991) 3 SSC 114 where it was held that unless the legal heir of the tenant impleaded does not represent the entire estate owing to collusion with the landlord, represents the entire estate and there is no need to implead all the legal heirs. It is not the case of the petitioners/tenants that there is any animosity between the petitioners Mukesh Nigam and Pramod Nigam on the one hand and Sarajoo Nigam on the other hand or that the petitioners Mukesh Nigam and Pramod Nigam are in collusion with the respondents/landlords. There is thus no merit in the said argument.

10. The next argument of the counsel for the petitioners/tenants is that as per the respondents/landlords, only the first floor was let to the predecessor of the petitioners/tenants and that the predecessor of the petitioners/tenants had raised unauthorised construction at the level of second and third floors above the first floor. The counsel contends that though the petitioners/tenants controvert that they/their predecessor raised unauthorised construction but such being the case of the respondents/landlords, the respondents/landlords cannot seek eviction of the petitioners/tenants from the portion claimed by the respondents/landlords to have been unauthorisedly constructed by the petitioners/tenants’ predecessor.

11. I have enquired from the counsel for the petitioners/tenants whether not the principle of accretion to the tenancy premises would apply.

12. The counsel has not volunteered any reply to the aforesaid.

13. Under Section 108(d) of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, if any accession is made to the leasehold property during the continuance of the lease, such accession is deemed to be comprised in the lease. Supreme Court, in Chaps










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