The central legal point established in the judgment is the importance of following the correct procedure in criminal prosecution, ensuring that evidence is recorded in the presence of the accused and adhering to the prescribed procedure for warrant trial cases.

1. The second respondent had instituted a criminal complaint on 22.06.2007 in the court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi (ACMM) against the petitioner alleging offence punishable under Sections 354 / 448/ 506 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). It appears the petitioner stood summoned on the basis of preliminary inquiry and, thereafter, was put on trial on the basis of charge for offences punishable under Sections 448, 354, 506 IPC framed on 08.08.2014 to which he pleaded not guilty. On the conclusion of the trial held thereafter, by judgment dated 24.05.2016 of the Metropolitan Magistrate-01 (Mahila Courts) of South-East District at Saket, the petitioner was held guilty and convicted for offence under Section 354 IPC but acquitted of the charge on other two counts. By subsequent order dated 04.06.2016, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 15 months (referred to in the order as “vigorous imprisonment”) and a fine of Rs.10,000/- to be paid as compensation to the victim and in case of default to undergo further imprisonment of 15 days. He preferred criminal appeal 10/2017 in the court of sessions which was dismissed by judgment dated 03.04.2017.

2. He has come up with the criminal revision petition at hand before this court assailing the said judgment, and order of the trial court, as also of the first appellate court, primarily raising the question of propriety of the procedure.

3. In view of the contentions urged, the trial court record has been called for and perused. The second respondent has also appeared and accepted notice on the basis of advance copy and has been heard through counsel.

4. A perusal of the trial court record does indicate that the Metropolitan Magistrate did not apply the correct procedure. The proceedings rather give rise to serious anxiety as to the manner in which the parties to the case were given indulgence at several stages so as to not only result in a protracted trial but also vitiating the procedure and consequently the result.

5. As mentioned above, the criminal complaint, presented on 22.06.2007, resulted in pre-summoning inquiry under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr. PC) on 16.11.2007. The affidavit of the complainant was taken on record as evidence and, thereafter, the case was posted for hearing arguments on the question of summoning. This was not a correct method to apply. Eventually, the Magistrate rose to the occasion and, on 31.03.2008, recorded the formal statement of the complainant, she appearing as CW-1 at that stage. On the basis of such statement of CW-1, apparently statement made in inquiry under Section 200 Cr. PC, the Magistrate recorded prima facie satisfaction as to commission of offence by the accused and, therefore, proceeded to issue summons, thereby dispensing with the further inquiry under Section 202 Cr. PC.

6. The presence of the petitioner was secured on 02.08.2008. After admitting the petitioner on bail, the matter was adjourned for cross-examination of the complainant to be conducted on 20.12.2008 in “PCE” – it apparently meant to convey “pre-charge evidence”, adding that the counsel for the complainant had “adopted” the chief-examination recorded in “PSE” (the abbreviation apparently meant to indicate “pre-summoning evidence”). It may be observed here itself that the use of abbreviations in judicial proceedings must be minimal and only such abbreviations ought to be used as are common in practice. Tendency to coin new abbreviations without explaining them is not proper.

7. The case remained at the stage of pre-charge evidence for a long time thereafter for some reason or the other, including the absence of the presiding officer from the court. The matter kept hanging fire and it is noted that the petitioner also added to the reasons for delay.

8. By order dated 27.06.2011, the Magistrate adjourned the matter for arguments on charge to be heard on the next date observing “pre-charge evidence led”. This appa