VINOD GOEL, J.

1. Challenge in this Criminal Appeal is to impugned judgment dated 28.10.2015 passed by the Trial Court whereby respondents 2 & 3 were acquitted for the offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short ‘NI Act’).

2. Brief facts leading to the present criminal appeal are that the appellant, a proprietary firm through sole proprietor Pawan Bansal is engaged in the business of supplying timber and plywood. The respondent no.3 is the proprietor of respondent no.2 firm M/s Bosecage. Respondent no.1 through its proprietor used to purchase timber and plywood from the appellant. On 18.12.2010 the respondent no.2 & 3 had purchased goods worth Rs.1,72,522/- from the appellant and a bill no.254 (tax invoice) was raised against this transaction. Respondent no.3 issued a cheque no.222181 dated 18.12.2010 drawn on State Bank of India, branch Kalkaji, New Delhi in favour of the appellant against the said Bill. The said cheque was dishonoured for the reason “Payment Stopped by Drawer” vide memo dated 21.12.2010. The appellant got issued a legal notice dated 31.12.2010 by Regd. AD & UPC dated 04.01.2011 to the respondent no.2 through its proprietor respondent no.3 calling upon them to make the payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. Notice was duly served upon respondent no.2 & 3. Despite the service of notice, the respondents no.2 & 3 failed to make the payment within the stipulated period of 15 days and hence the complaint.

3. The Trial Court acquitted respondents 2 & 3 on two grounds (i) the bill/invoice no. 254 dated 18.12.2010 had cutting/ interpolation on the date mentioned on it and (ii) no other invoice was placed on record to show that the appellant and respondents no.2 & 3 had dealings up to December 2010.

4. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the Trial Court erred in acquitting the respondent no.2 & 3. He submitted that the impugned judgment was not based on the settled principles of law and the Trial Court did not correctly appreciate the facts and evidence on record.

5. He argued that under sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act, there is a presumption against the accused in a case under section 138 of the NI Act and the respondent no.2 & 3 were not able to rebut this presumption by cogent evidence. He relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rangappa v Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441 to further cement his arguments.

6. He further argued that the respondent admitted that a sum of Rs.9200/- was due and payable to the appellant in the month of October/November 2010 but did not pay it to the appellant. He contended that the malafide on the respondent’s part is evident from her conduct of having submitted a false application to stop payment to her banker in advance on 01.12.2010 and then issued the cheque in question dated 18.12.2010 subsequently.

7. He urged that the Trial Court erred in not appreciating the fact that though there was overwriting on the date of the bill, month and year remain intact and the correction of date is signed by the appellant just above the same.

8. The learned counsel for the appellant had contended that the cheque in question admittedly was “signed” and “dated” by respondent no.3 herself.

9. He further urged that the Trial Court erred in overlooking the various inconsistencies and contradictions in the statements of respondent no.3. The learned counsel of the appellant contended that respondent no.3 kept on changing her stand throughout before the filing of the complaint, after appearance before the learned MM and during the course of the trial. He argued that change of defence by itself makes the version of the respondent unreliable.

10. He contended that the legal notice dated 31.12.2010 issued to respondent no.2 & 3 was not replied to and an adverse inference can be drawn from this fact. He relies in Rangappa’s case (supra) (para 29) to substantiate this point.

11. He further contended that there is no mention of