The main legal point established in the judgment is that encroachers of public land are not entitled to equitable relief in the form of injunction, and settled possession with acquiescence of the true owner is necessary to claim such relief.

VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J.

1. This Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) is filed by the appellant/plaintiff impugning the judgment of the First Appellate Court dated 6.3.2017 by which the first appellate court accepted the appeal filed by the defendant in the suit and set aside the judgment of the Trial Court dated 24.11.2015 by which the trial court while dismissing the suit of the appellant/plaintiff for one relief of grant of alternative allotment however decreed the suit for the second relief that the members of the appellant/plaintiff association should not be dispossessed without due process of law from their portions which they are occupying in DDA Parking, Rohtak Road Transport Centre, Punjabi Bagh, Delhi-35. I may note that the appellant/plaintiff did not file any appeal against the judgment of the trial court dated 24.11.2015 by which the trial court dismissed the suit by refusing to grant the prayer for alternative plots being granted to the members of the appellant/plaintiff.

2. The first appellate court by its impugned judgment has thoroughly examined the issue with respect to the claim of the appellant/plaintiff that the appellant/plaintiff should not be dispossessed without due process of law. While discussing this issue the first appellate court has held that admittedly the appellant/plaintiff does not claim any valid title or legal basis to continue to occupy the land of the respondent/Delhi Development Authority. The first appellate court also holds that 251 members of the appellant/plaintiff have not been proved to be in occupation of which specific portions as there is no delimitation in the site-plan filed. The first appellate court has referred to the three Supreme Court judgments which hold that courts should not grant equitable relief to encroachers of public land. Also, it has been held by the first appellate court by reference to a judgment of the Supreme Court that mere possession is not enough for grant of injunction because the possession must be such to which there must be acquiescence by the owner of the land and that an encroacher has no acquiescence of the owner of the land to occupy the land much less valuable public land.

3. Since the first appellate court has done a very thorough and exhaustive job in dealing with the issues and has also referred to the relevant judgments of the Supreme Court, I would instead of my own language refer to and adopt the reasoning and discussion of the first appellate court as contained in paras 9 to 14 of the impugned judgment and which paras read as under:-

“9. The plaintiff’s association has not denied the fact that the members of the association have unauthorizedly occupied the government land which was meant for parking. However, they have claimed their right to the suit premises on the basis of the possession. Ld. Trial Court has relied upon the various documents and communications exchanged between the plaintiff’s association and defendant in respect of the allotment of the suit premises. To reach the conclusion that the members of the plaintiff’s association are in occupation of the suit premises and therefore, the defendant cannot evict them therefore without due process of law. However, in order to get the injunction the plaintiff was required, in the first instance, to specify and describe the property on which the right of occupation has been claimed. No site plan has been filed on behalf of the plaintiff’s association to define the area which is being occupied by various members of the plaintiff’s association. On the basis of the evidence produced by the plaintiff’s association, it can be assumed that 251 members of the plaintiff’s association are in occupation of the various sites around the DDA parking, but the separate portion in occupation of these members cannot be ascertained. The site plan Ex.PW1/8 relied upon by Ld. Trial Court does not by any means specify the shares of the members of plaintiff’