C.HARI SHANKAR, J.

1. Under challenge, in the present writ petition, is an award, dated 16th July, 2004, whereby the Labour Court No. VII (hereinafter referred to as “the Labour Court”) has directed payment, by the Central Secretariat Club (hereinafter referred to as “The Club”) of Rs.15,240/-, to the workman Geetam Singh, for the period October, 1992 to September, 1995.

2. The aforementioned award has been assailed, before this Court, by Geetam Singh as well as by the Club, vide W.P (C) 19106/2005 and W.P (C) 17474/2004 respectively.

3. The facts are brief Geetam Singh, the applicant, who was undisputedly employed by the Club registered a claim, under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for the difference in wages between the amount paid to him by the management of the club and the minimum wages payable to him under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 for the period during which he worked with the Club i.e.13th September 1989 till 30th September 1995. The management of the Club contested the claim of Geetam Singh, before the Labour Court, by urging that (i) the club was not an “industry” as its membership was confined to employees of the Central Secretariat and (ii) the claim of Geetam Singh was belated, as he had filed his claim petition only in 1995 claiming difference of wages from 1989. The Labour Court rejected the preliminary submission, of the Club, to the effect that it was not an “industry”, by placing reliance on the classic pronouncement of Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. R. Rajappa, (1978) 3 SCC 297 which categorically held that clubs were also industries. A reading of the said judgment makes it clear that the applicability of the Act was exempted only in a case in which the enterprise was clearly charitable in nature, without any financial transaction being involved. Mr. Satya Narayan Vashisht, appearing for the petitioner candidly admitted the fact that his client did in fact, charge subscription from its members. As such, no error can be discerned, in the finding of the Labour Court, to the effect that the club was an “industry” within the meaning of the Act.

4. The second contention, of limitation/delay and latches was accepted, in part, by the Labour Court. Placing reliance on a judgment of this Court M/s. M. S. Shoes East Ltd. v. M.R.T.P 2003 VIII AD (Delhi), the Labour Court held that, even though no period of limitation was specified in Section 33 C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, all claims there under had to be filed within a reasonable time, which was determined, in the said decision, to be three years.

5. Following on the above reasoning, the Labour Court directed the management, to pay to Geetam Singh, the difference in wages for the period October 1992 to September 1995.

6. Mr. Satya Narayan Vashisht, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submits that his client is willing to pay the amount awarded by the Tribunal, of Rs. 15,240/-, representing the difference between the wages paid to Geetam Singh and the minimum wages payable to him, for the period October, 1992 to September, 1995.

7. Such magnanimity appears, however, to have dawned, on the petitioner, too late in the day, as, despite not obtaining any stay from this Court, it is admitted that no payment in accordance with the impugned award has been made to Geetam Singh, and all that has been paid to him, by the Club, are litigation expenses, pursuant to the direction of this Court.

8. Mr. Anuj Aggarwal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, submits that his client is entitled to be paid difference in wages for entire period 13th September 1989 to 30th September, 1995 and that, therefore, the Labour Court materially erred in limiting the award of differential wages only to the period October 1992 to September, 1995. The finding, of the Labour Court, that claims under Section 33C of the Act could be awarded only up to 3 years pr