The main legal point established is that a suit can be dismissed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC if it is time-barred and an abuse of process, and the alleged agreement to sell is unenforceable due to legal provisions such as the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956.

JAYANT NATH, J.

CM(M) 1179/2015 & CM No.29169/2015

1. This petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India seeking to impugn the order dated 23.12.2014 passed by the learned trial court dismissing the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC filed by the petitioners/defendants.

2. Brief relevant facts are that the respondents/plaintiffs have filed a suit for specific performance and injunction on 18.08.2011. As per the suit, it is claimed that sometimes in November, 1984 the respondents/plantiffs sought physical possession of the suit property being 3rd Floor, Flat No.3, formerly known as Scindia House, Connaught Place, Janpath, New Delhi and now known as Atma Ram Properties Pvt. Ltd. It is urged that they got physical possession based on an oral agreement to sell between the parties. It is urged that the petitioners/defendants purchased the said property on 14.06.1984 and intended to sell the same property. Hence, in the presence of a common friend Sh.Manmohan Khanna, the deal was finalised in the month of December, 1984 for a total sum of Rs.10 lacs. A sum of Rs.7.50 lacs was paid to the petitioners as part payment. There is no plea of any receipt being executed as evidence of payment of the said amount. The balance Rs.2.50 lacs was to be paid at the time of execution of the sale documents. It is further urged that agreement to sell and other title documents could not be executed at that time since petitioner Nos.2 to 5(defendants No.2 to 5) who also had title qua the suit property, were minors and it was represented by father of respondent No.2 Sh.Balbir Singh that a petition filed by the petitioners was pending disposal before the District Judge, Delhi seeking permission to sell the property on behalf of the minors. It is stated that the respondents thereafter kept on inquiring from Sh.Balbir Singh about the fate of the petition pending in the court of District Judge. It is further stated that the petitioner Sh.Balbir Singh purported to execute a lease deed in December, 1984 (29.12.1984). Though the instrument was executed as lease deed but as per the stipulations contained therein, the respondents/plaintiffs can use and enjoy the premises as owner thereof. The lease deed provides power to sub-let and that the tenancy cannot be terminated. It also purports to put an obligation to pay rent of Rs.2,500/- per month on the respondents because a sum of Rs.2.50 lacs remained outstanding. The sum of Rs. 2,500/- which was though described as rent was actually interest payable by the respondents for the outstanding dues. It is further urged that somewhere in the year 2007, the petitioners suddenly stopped receiving the said payment of Rs.2,500/- per month. It is further urged that the respondents were shocked when pursuant to a summon received from the Additional Rent Controller, they learnt that the petitioners had filed an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). It was on receipt of a copy of the eviction petition, it is claimed that the respondents came to know that the petitioners are trying to wriggle out of the contractual obligation of executing the sale deed of the property in favour of the respondent.

3. The petitioners filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC wherein various pleas were raised as to why the plaint is liable to be rejected. It was urged that the suit is without cause of action as there is no contract/agreement to sell, nor essential ingredients as provided under a valid agreement to sell exist. It was secondly urged that the suit is barred by limitation. It further urged that suit is not maintainable in terms of Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is also stated that the suit is barred under the provisions of Sections 23, 25 and 29 of the Contract Act and Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act. Other pleas are also taken.

4. The trial court by its impugned order dismissed the application of the