The status of a party, such as being a multinational company, does not entitle it to extraordinary leeway for condonation of delay.

VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J.

C.M. No.34247/2017 (for condonation of delay of 527 days) in RFA No.798/2017

1. By the impugned judgment, the trial court has decreed the suit for a sum of Rs.3,15,226/- along with interest at 12% per annum on account of work which the respondent/plaintiff is said to have done for the appellant/defendant with respect to communication lines laid down for Meerut-Shamli OFC route.

2. No doubt, delay is condoned liberally by courts. Also courts are liberal in condoning the delay because rights of parties should not ordinarily be defeated on account of delay. Supreme Court has therefore observed and held in the judgment in the case of N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy AIR 1998 SC 3222 that there is no vested right in filing an appeal with delay and delay must ordinarily be condoned unless the delay is on account of gross/grave negligence.

3. Let us examine the facts of the present case whether delay should be condoned.

4. At the outset, it is to be noted that appellant is not some small citizen having limited financial means or infrastructure but the appellant is a gigantic multinational company being a company which is part of international chain of the telecommunications giant Vodafone. When condonation of delay is applied by such companies they would not have equities similar to a small citizen who lacks financial means or other common citizens. Also, though every day of delay has not to be explained, and sufficient cause must cover the general period of delay, sufficient cause has to be however sufficient cause i.e something which effectively more or less stopped the filing of the appeal or prevented the filing of the appeal. There is a difference between the reasons constituting sufficient cause and facts as to how the period of delay has been explained. All facts do not constitute sufficient cause.

5. In the present case, the facts pleaded do not constitute sufficient cause will become clear from paras 5 and 6 of the present application and these paras read as under:-

“5. It is most respectfully submitted herein that the Appellant has not been able to present the said Regular First Appeal within the prescribed Period of Limitation of Ninety Days as has been provided in the Article-116(a) of the Limitation Act, 1963. However, the Appellant intends to make out a “Sufficient Cause” for seeking the Relief to condone the delay of 527 days in filing the Regular First Appeal. The Explanation to constitute “Sufficient Cause” is being explained herein under on the basis of the Facts submitted in the Table herein below: