The appointment of a public office holder can be challenged through a writ of quo warranto only if it is alleged to violate a statutory rule.

C. HARI SHANKAR, J.

1. After hearing arguments on behalf of both sides, we had, on 11th April, 2018, dismissed the present writ petition, stating that the reasons for our decision would follow. This judgment proceeds to record the said reasons.

2. The petitioner, who is a student pursuing his Vidyavaridhi (Ph.D.) with the Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha (Respondent No 4 herein, and referred to, hereinafter, as “the Vidyapeetha”) claims to be aggrieved by the appointment, of Respondent No. 5 [who, at that time, was working as Vice Chancellor (I/C) of the Vidyapeetha] as regular Vice Chancellor of the Vidyapeetha. The petitioner prays, therefore, for issuance of a writ of quo warranto, quashing Office Memorandum (OM), dated 26th August, 2015 issued by the Secretariat of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) and Order, dated 28th August, 2015, issued by the Language Division in the Department of Higher Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development of the Government of India (Respondent No. 1 herein). The OM, dated 26th August, 2015, issued by the ACC communicates, to the Department of Higher Education, the approval of the ACC, to, inter alia, the appointment of Respondent No. 5 as Vice Chancellor (hereinafter referred to as “VC”) of the Vidyapeetha. The Order dated 28th August, 2015, issued by Respondent No. 1, is in the nature of a sequel to the OM dated 26th August, 2015, noting the approvals accorded by the ACC and communicated thereby (including, that is, the approval to the appointment of Respondent No. 5 as VC of the Vidyapeetha).

3. The writ petition contains several averments and allegations which are totally irrelevant, for the purposes of the prayers made therein; we, accordingly, eschew any reference to the said averments, and limit our peregrinations to examining the validity of the impugned OM dated 26th August, 2015 and Office Order, dated 28 August, 2015 supra. We would, indeed, be transgressing our jurisdiction were we to do otherwise, in view of the settled position, in law, that public interest petitions are ordinarily proscribed in service matters, save and except in cases where issuance of a writ of quo warranto is sought, on the ground that the appointment, to the public office under challenge, is alleged to be violative of some statutory provision. [Hari Bansh Lal vs Sahodar Prasad Mahto, (2010) 9 SCC 655] Our examination has, therefore, to limit itself to assessing the validity of the approval, by the ACC, to the appointment of Respondent No. 5 as VC of the Vidyapeetha, qua the rules/executive instructions governing the same.

4. Apparently conscious of this legal position, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has also limited his challenge, to the appointment of Respondent No. 5 as VC of the Vidyapeetha, urging that the said appointment violated (i) OMs dated 3rd July, 2006 and 30th July, 2007, issued by the Department of Personnel and Training (DOPT) and (ii) Clause No 29 of the Memorandum of Association (hereinafter referred to as “the MOA”) of the Vidyapeetha. Though, stricto sensu, it would not be possible to elevate the OMs issued by the DOPT, or, indeed, the MoA of the Vidyapeetha, to the status of statutory rules, we have, nevertheless, chosen not to non-suit the petitioner on this technicality, and have examined the challenge raised by the petitioner, on its merits.

5. Having said that, the petitioner has not chosen, while alleging infraction of the OM dated 3rd July, 2006, of the DOPT, either to annex the said OM, or extract the relevant clause thereof, in the writ petition. We, therefore, are limiting our consideration, qua this aspect of the matter, to the OM dated 30th July, 2007; in any case, the averments in para 7 of the writ petition seem to indicate that the OMs dated 3rd July, 2006 and 30th July, 2007 are more or less akin to each other, insofar as the relevance, to the cause ventilated by the petitioner in the present case, is concerned.

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