SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Article Pause Article
judgment-img

2018 Supreme(Del) 2114

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, A.K.CHAWLA, JJ.
SURENDRA KUMAR JAIN - Petitioner
Versus
PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (CENTRAL)-III, NEW DELHI & ANR - Respondents
W.P.(C) 4304 to 4311, 4313 to 4316, 4318, 4319 of 2018 & CM APPL.16759 to 16764, 16766, 16768, 16772, 16774, 16781, 16782, 16786, 16787 of 2018
Decided on : 01-10-2018

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Petitioner: Mr.Piyush Kaushik, Adv.
For the Respondent: Mr.Ajit Sharma and Mr.Asheesh Jain, Adv.

The specific period of limitation prescribed for completion of remand under Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act influenced the court's decision in quashing the assessment order made after the remand.

Headnote:

Income Tax Act - Assessment Order - Section 153A, Section 254 - Summary of Acts and Sections: Section 153A, Section 254, Section 132, Section 153, Section 153B, Section 260A - The court discussed the interpretation of the non-obstante clause in Section 153 of the Income Tax Act, the special provision under Section 153B for completion of block assessments, and the period of limitation prescribed for completion of remand under Section 153(2A). The court's decision was influenced by the specific period of limitation prescribed for completion of remand and the need to initiate proceedings within the prescribed time in case of search and seizure assessments.

Fact of the Case:

The assessees challenged the assessment order made under Section 153A read with Section 254 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for Assessment Year 2005-06 and subsequent years covered by search assessment, arguing that the orders were barred and needed to be quashed.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the assessment order made after the remand dated 22.12.2017 was beyond the period of limitation and therefore quashed the impugned order and all consequential orders and actions.

Issues: The main issue was whether the assessment order made after the remand was within the prescribed period of limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the interpretation of the non-obstante clause in Section 153 of the Income Tax Act, the special provision under Section 153B for completion of block assessments, and the period of limitation prescribed for completion of remand under Section 153(2A).

Final Decision: The court quashed the impugned order and all consequential orders and actions, allowing the writ petitions.

JUDGMENT :

S.RAVINDRA BHAT, J.

1. In all these writ petitions, the narrow question agitated by the assessees is that assessment order made on 22.12.2017 under Section 153A read with Section 254 of Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter “the Act”) for Assessment Year 2005-06 and subsequent years (up-to 2012-13) covered by search assessment, were barred and therefore, needs to be quashed.

2. The brief facts necessary to decide these writ petitions are that pursuant to search and seizure proceedings under Section 132 of the Act, the assessment was completed for the block period on 28.03.2013 by the concerned Assessing Officer (AO). The Commissioner of Income Tax (A) partly allowed the assessee’s appeal on 14.08.2014. The matter was carried further to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) which remitted the matter back to the AO to complete the assessment de novo. The assessee contends that in fact the concerned AO sought tax effect by re-computing the income under Section 153A of the Act, in effect, following the ITAT’s order of 18.02.2016. Relying upon that order, the assessment proceedings were taken up after remand by the AO who completed them on 22.12.2017. Relying upon the Full Bench decision of this Court in Odeon Builders Pvt. Ltd. vs. Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax-4, (2017) 393 ITR 27, it is urged on behalf of the assessees that the impugned order is per se illegal and void. It was contended that apart from the AO’s order – made after the ITAT’s decision (on 18.02.2016), there is other evidence as well, in the form of reply to the assessee’s ITR queries dated 12.03.2018 where the revenue clearly admitted that the order was served by hand to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Departmental Representative) on 30.03.2016. Taking strength from the then existing proviso to Section 153(2A), it is urged that time available then to the AO in this case was only up-to 31.12.2016, for working out of the remand and completing the assessment.

3. The revenue resisted the proceedings and urged that the impugned order was made within the time prescribed. Firstly, it is urged that petitioners cannot be heard to complain as they did not attend to the queries and co-operate in an assessment proceeding which got delayed. Learned counsel emphasized that as a result the petitioners could not be given any discretionary relief given that the petitioner was an entry provider/facilitator and that the search resulted in addition of Rs.70 crores as income in his hand. Secondly, it was argued that the plain reading of Section 153A of the Act would reveal that it overrides the other provisions of the Act – because of the non-obstante clause. Elaborating further, it was submitted that period of limitation prescribed by Section 153B i.e. two years is substantial that excludes search assessment and therefore, excludes applicability of Section 153(2A) which is general and governs all demands other than those concerning search assessment.

4. The question as to what would be the starting point of limitation with respect to any proceedings which are to be initiated by the revenue or any steps to be taken by it, was the precise issue of point of determination by this Court in Odeon Builders (supra). The Court then held as follows:

“28. The above decisions under Section 256 (3) are clearly distinguishable. The limitation for the purpose of Section 256 begins to run the moment the order is communicated to the parties. Another distinction to be drawn is that the word used in Section 256 of the Act “served” whereas under Section 260A it is “received”. The word “received” has to be seen in the context of the decision in CIT v. Sudhir Choudhrie (supra), which made it mandatory for pronouncement of the orders of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. At the time of such pronouncement, apart from the authorized representative of the assessee, the Departmental representative is expected to remain present. Through him the Department becomes immediately aware of the said judgment of t






























Click Here to Read the rest of this document

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top