The presentation of the cheque in a particular place for collection confers jurisdiction on the court at that place, and the amendment of the law by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015, has implications for the legal position declared in previous cases.

1. On the criminal complaint (no.3132/1/2007) instituted by the respondent, after a preliminary inquiry, the Metropolitan Magistrate by order dated 27.02.2008 summoned the petitioner as accused for offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The present petition invoking the inherent power of this court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Cr.PC) was filed seeking quashing of the said order and the proceedings arising out of the criminal complaint, it having been presented in August 2011 on the plea that the knowledge about the issuance of the process was gained only after non-bailable warrants had been issued on 05.02.2011.

2. The petition has been resisted by the respondent (complainant).

3. The copy of the criminal complaint leading to the summoning order being passed would show that the petitioner had issued a cheque dated 21.09.2007 against his account with Smith Barney Citibank, New Jersey, USA in the sum of US $ 250,000. The cheque was statedly handed over by the petitioner (accused) to the respondent (complainant) at his residence at A-5, Maharani Bagh, New Delhi. It was presented by the complainant to his banker, HDFC Bank, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi on 22.09.2007 but was returned unpaid with remarks “refer to drawer”. As per the case of the respondent/complainant, he had issued a notice demanding the payment of the cheque amount but the petitioner (accused) failed to abide by the said demand, this constituting the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

4. It is the contention of the petitioner that the proceedings before the trial court are in the nature of abuse of the process, the court in India having no jurisdiction in the matter since the cheque was issued against a bank account in United States of America. It is also the contention of the petitioner that the claim about A-5, Maharani Bagh, New Delhi, being the residence of the complainant is false. The petitioner also contends that mere presentation of the cheque in a bank at a particular place (Delhi) would not confer jurisdiction on the court at that place. The contention of the petitioner further is that the cheque in question would be governed by the substantive law of USA.

5. While this petition had been pending, on 10.12.2014, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the jurisdiction of the court at Delhi stood ousted, in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharasthra and Anr, (2014) 9 SCC 129, this presumably with reference to the averment of the complainant before the court below that the cheque had been presented for collection by the bank at New Delhi. The matter, remained pending, it having been adjourned from time to time, no interest having been shown in effective hearing.

6. During the pendency, however, on account of non-appearance of the petitioner before the Metropolitan Magistrate, by order dated 26.08.2017, assurance on his behalf that he would appear on the date next fixed was recorded with the caution that if he were to fail to appear, coercive action will be taken. It has been submitted by the counsel for the respondent (complainant), and is conceded by the counsel for the petitioner that, by proceedings recorded on 22.05.2012, the criminal complaint was taken to the stage of trial with formal notice under Section 251 Cr. PC having been issued and served on the petitioner, his plea of not guilty along with his defence having been duly recorded, his prayer for liberty to cross-examine the complainant under Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 also having been granted and the case being taken to the next stage for such opportunity to be availed. It may be added that the proceedings of 26.08.2017, as were noted in the order dated 15.09.2017, also show that for such purposes of cross-examination of the complainant by the petitioner, the matter was adjourned as “last opportunity” for 16.09.2017. The proce