The main legal point established is that summoning orders must be based on sufficient evidence and proper legal procedure, and the court has the authority to intervene if the process of the court is being abused.

1. By the order dated 24.01.2014, the Metropolitan Magistrate, acting upon the report of investigation which had been submitted before him pursuant to order dated 20.09.2006 in the context of the First Information Report (FIR) No.41/2000 of Police Station Punjabi Bagh, directed summons to be issued to the petitioner calling him upon to appear as an accused to face prosecution for offences punishable under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).

2. Aggrieved by the said order(s), the petitioner (the accused) approached this court invoking its inherent power and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) submitting that the process initiated by such order is in the nature of abuse of process of court, his prayer being for the same to be set aside. The petition is resisted by the complainant (the second respondent), the State (first respondent) taking a neutral position.

3. Submissions of both sides have been heard at length and the record has been perused.

4. It is essential to go into the history of the dispute between the parties and for such purposes reference needs to be made to the pleadings of a civil suit [CS (OS) No.1005/1998] that had been initiated by the second respondent (the complainant) against Anand Prakash Khandelwal, father of the petitioner, he having been described as the managing trustee of Ram Charitable Trust, Jaipur, the suit being for the recovery of Rs.2,34,44,300/- with interest. According to the case of the complainant (as the plaintiff), Anand Prakash Khandelwal, the defendant of the suit, was a trustee of Ram Charitable Trust, Jaipur, residing at A-6/10, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi-110066. It was pleaded that the plaintiff (the complainant) had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) dated 01.11.1994 with the said defendant, in terms of which the latter had agreed to sell to the former the property of the trust, it having been described as Khasra No.225, Village Bhojpura, Jaipur which was earmarked for development of a hotel located on one side of Tonk Road and the other side by Bhawani Singh Road. In terms of the MoU, the responsibility for transfer of the subject property in the name of the plaintiff would have been of the defendant and all the charges for clearances from the appropriate authorities of State Govt. for the construction of a five star hotel project thereupon would also be of the defendant. It was alleged that the plaintiff had paid the consideration of Rs.5 lacs by cheque dated 25.10.1994, drawn on Canara Bank, Janpath and Rs.1.50 crores by cheque No.29203 dated 20.03.1995, drawn of Oriental Bank of Commerce, Panchkuin Road, New Delhi, which represented half of the total amount of consideration that had been settled. The cheque, as per the pleadings in the suit was encashed by the defendant and, in spite of the advance payment having been made, the defendant had failed to perform his part of the transaction. The plaintiff claimed that he had approached the defendant for refund of the amount with interest but there being no positive response, rather the defendant having refused to pay the amount back, the suit for recovery of the said amount along with interest was pressed.

5. Anand Prakash Khandelwal died on 27.10.1999. On 26.11.1999, an application was moved by the plaintiff of the case (i.e., the complainant) under Order XXII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (C.P.C.) seeking impleadment of the petitioner as the legal representative in place of the deceased defendant. In the said application the plaintiff referred to an “obituary” that had appeared in a newspaper after the death of the defendant, this bringing to his notice that the deceased defendant had left behind the petitioner herein as the son, the plaintiff not being aware as to the status of the wife of the deceased defendant, the plea, inter alia, being that the right to sue had survived against the petitioner.

6. It is stated by the counsel for th