The court clarified the procedure for raising objections and considering the ground of limitation for filing complaints of sexual harassment before the disciplinary or appellate authority.

G.S. SISTANI, J.

LPA 399/2018 and CM Nos. 29148/2018 (stay) and 30239/2018 (stay)

1. The appellant is aggrieved by the order dated 12.07.2018 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court.

2. The necessary facts to be noticed for disposal of this appeal are that four complaints of sexual harassment were made against the appellant. Three complaints were made between the period February 2017 and April 2017 and another complaint was made in the month of February 2018. It is the stand of the counsel for the appellant that the first three complaints have been filed beyond the period of limitation and the fourth complaint is also per se bad in law as there is no allegation of sexual harassment at the work place. Reliance is placed on Section 9 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). We may note that the learned Single Judge has rejected the prayer made in the writ petition for the reasons as mentioned in paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the order, which we reproduce below:-

“7. The plain reading of the order dated 21.05.2018, whereby the petitioner’s writ petition – W.P. (C) 5486/2018 captioned “Amit Kumar v. Bharati College New Delhi and Ors.” – was disposed of clearly indicates that the petitioner had limited his grievance to only two issues. First, the petitioner had urged that the inquiry could not be conducted by a subcommittee and was necessarily required to be heard by the ICC as constituted. Second, he had submitted that the ICC had not taken any steps for exploring the possibility of conciliation in terms of Section 10 of the Act.

8. It is thus apparent that the petitioner had given up his objections for challenging the jurisdiction of ICC to entertain the complaints on the ground that they were barred by limitation. On the contrary, the petitioner had insisted that the inquiry be conducted by the ICC en banc and not by a subcommittee. Mr. Nandrajog who was appearing for respondent no.1 in the said proceedings had suggested that as the complainants’ evidence had been concluded, the evidence of the petitioner could be recorded by the ICC. This suggestion found favour with the Court. Further, the learned counsel for the petitioner also concurred with the suggestion that the petitioner’s evidence be recorded by the ICC and not by the sub-committee. He also did not press his objection that since the evidence of the complainants was recorded by a subcommittee, it could not be examined by the ICC. The relevant extract of the said order is set out below:-

“5. There are two principal grievances that the petitioner has raised: First, that the Internal Complaint Committee (in short 'ICC') has delegated its role to the Sub Committee, which is contrary to the provisions of the Sexual Harassment of Women at workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (hereafter referred to as 'Act'). Second, that no attempt was made to take recourse to Section 10 of the Act which provides for conciliation.

6. Mr. Nandrajog, learned senior counsel, who appears for respondent no.l and 2 says that the ICC had entrusted the task of recording evidence to the Sub-Committee comprising of Members of the ICC and that this was done in line with the recommendations contained in the "Saksham Report" which has, broadly been adopted by the UGC, vide its impugned notification dated 07.05.2016.

6.1 Furthermore, learned senior counsel says that since the complainant's evidence has been concluded grievance, if any, of the petitioner with regard to a delegation by ICC of the aforesaid task to the Subcommittee, can be redressed by having his evidence being recorded by the ICC.

6.2 This suggestion is made by Mr. Nandrajog, learned senior counsel, is constructive as this would prevent revictimisation of the complainants.

6.3 Insofar as the grievance raised by the petitioner qua the failure on the part of respondents to trigger section 10 of the Act is concerned, Mr.