The central legal point established in the judgment is the impermissibility of recovery from the respondent based on the principles laid down in the judgments of State of Punjab and Others v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) and related cases.

Vipin Sanghi, J.

Cav No. 153/2019

The caveat has been listed. However, none appears for respondent No.1 Caveator. The caveat stands disposed of.

W.P.(C) 1558/2019 & C.M. No. 7217/2019

2. The MTNL has preferred the present writ petition to assail the order dated 06.09.2018 passed by Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (the Tribunal) in O.A. No. 551/2017, whereby the Tribunal has allowed the Original Application preferred by respondent No. 1 and set aside the letter dated 26.12.2014 issued by the petitioner rejecting the respondent's representation. The Tribunal has directed the petitioner to pay to the respondent No.1, the amount of Rs. 1,97,253/- within 90 days of receipt of the copy of the order.

3. The respondent was serving as Sub Divisional Engineer (SDE) in MTNL from where he superannuated on 31.12.2014. Four days before his superannuation, a letter was issued which he received on 29.12.2014 from the DGM (Cash & Tax) MTNL, informing him regarding deduction of Rs. 1,97,253/- which had been overpaid to him on account of inadvertent grant of two annual increments way back on 14.06.1995 i.e. nearly 20 years ago. This was followed by the aforesaid deduction from the payment of leave encashment due to the respondent upon his retirement on 31.12.2014.

4. The respondent No.1 represented against the said deduction and his representation was rejected on 04.04.2015. The respondent then further represented and within one year of the first rejection, came the second rejection on 17.03.2016. The respondent No.1 then preferred the Original Application, sometime in February, 2017, to assail the said deduction from his retiral dues by placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab and Others v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer), (2015) 4 SCC 334, (hereinafter referred as Rafiq Masih 2).

5. The Tribunal invoked the principles laid down in the said decision and allowed the claim.

6. Mr. Dutt, learned senior counsel for the petitioner states that the respondent was not a Class III or Class IV employee. He received retiral dues to the tune of Rs. 32 lakhs and, therefore, the deduction of Rs. 1,97,253/- was not so grave as to cause undue hardship to him. He had no legal right to retain the said amount as it was inadvertently paid to him. He, therefore, submits that the decision in Rafiq Masih 2 could not be invoked in this case. He further submits that in State of Punjab and Others v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer), (2014) 8 SCC 883, (hereinafter referred as Rafiq Masih 1), the three-judge Bench to which the matter was referred to resolve an apparent conflict between Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India, (1994) 2 SCC 521, and Sahib Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) Supp1 SCC 18, on one hand, and Chandi Prasad Uniyal V. State of Uttarakhand, (2012) 8 SCC 417, on the other hand, observed that the orders issued in Shyam Babu Verma (supra) were in exercise of the powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. He submits that, on the other hand, the judgment in Chandi Prasad Uniyal (supra) was a judgment rendered in exercise of the power of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Thus, according to Mr. Dutt, it is the judgment in Chandi Prasad Uniyal (supra) which forms the binding precedent. He submits that only the Supreme Court could pass an order by resort to Article 142 of the Constitution, to deny the right of the employer to recover the amounts paid erroneously, which the employee has no legal right to retain or appropriate.

7. Mr. Dutt further submits that the Original Application was barred by limitation and even, though the said objection was raised by the petitioner before the Tribunal, the Tribunal has not examined the same.

8. Having heard learned senior counsel for the petitioner and examined the record, we find no merit in this petition. So far as the aspect of limitation is concerned, it is noticed that the first rejection of the respondent's r