IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Vikramajit Sen, J.
Saketh India Limited - Appellant
Versus
W. Diamond India Limited - Respondent
RFA(OS) 114/2009 & CM Nos. 17726-27/2009 With EFA(OS) 33/2008
Decided On : 30-04-2010
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Order 38 - Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 - Section 22 - As soon as a claim stands admitted, either because it has been reflected in the Scheme, or because it stands favorably adjudicated in a Court of law, the protection would be automatically implemented - Court held to be in error in coming to the conclusion that the provisions thereof are not attracted only because the debt had been incurred after the Company was declared to be a sick one - Having obtained a decree, further proceedings fall within the protective mantle of Section 22 as they cannot but be in the nature of "execution, distress or the like".
Vikramajit Sen, J.
1. The Appellant, Saketh India Limited, assails the impugned Order of the learned Single Judge passed on 24.8.2009, whereby two Applications preferred by the Appellant/Defendant were dismissed and the Suit filed under Order XXXVIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (`CPC' for short) for the recovery of mesne profits for the sum of Rupees 31,30,153/- together with interest and costs was decreed. In the first Application, IA No. 1171/2006, the Appellant/Defendant prayed for condonation of delay in entering appearance (that is filing the Address Form). In the second Application, IA No. 1170/2006, the Appellant/Defendant sought the rejection of the Plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC on the ground that it had been declared a Sick Industrial Unit in terms of Section 3 (1) (o) of Sick Industrial Companies (special Provisions) Act, 1985 (`SICA' for short). Before us, the only aspect that has been argued is that SICA places a complete prohibition on all judicial proceedings leaving no alternative to the Trial Judge other than ordering the rejection of the Plaint.
2. It appears from a perusal of the records that Summons in Form 4 under Order XXXVII of the CPC were served on Defendant No. 1 by affixation at Hosur, Karnataka on 22.8.2005 and on Defendant No. 2 on 30.8.2005 at Bangalore. The aforementioned Applications filed on behalf of the Defendants are dated 25.1.2006 and were filed on that very day; they have been supported by Affidavits of Defendant No. 2 who is the Managing Director of Defendant No. 1. On 7.11.2008, the learned Single Judge directed the Defendants to file, within four weeks, an affidavit stating whether or not the monies claimed by the Plaintiff have been admitted by the Defendant and have been reflected in the documents filed by the Defendant before the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (`BIFR' for short). On 16.3.2009, the learned Single Judge granted a last opportunity to file the said Affidavit. On the next date of hearing, viz., 19.5.2009, the submission made on behalf of the Plaintiff to the effect that the Defendant was not before BIFR was recorded. In response, the Defendant stated that proceedings were pending before Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (`AAIFR' for short). Yet another opportunity to file the aforementioned Affidavit was granted to the Defendant, subject to payment of costs of Rupees 5,000/-. Since the directions were not complied with, costs were increased to Rupees 10,000/- and another chance for filing the said Affidavit before 24.8.2009 was permitted.
3. On 24.8.2009, the Court, keeping in perspective the plentitude of opportunities granted but not availed of by the Defendants to file the required Affidavit, as well as the Defendants failure to pay costs, dismissed both the Applications. The Court took into consideration that delay in entering appearance had not been condoned and, therefore, opined that all the averments in the Plaint were deemed to have been admitted, and decreed the Suit. This Appeal arises before us in these circumstances.
4. We are not persuaded by the arguments of learned counsel for the Appellant that the provisions of SICA should be applied to the facts of the present case. Assuming that there is a prohibition placed, and not just a moratorium, placed by Section 22 of SICA on legal proceedings against a company coming within the pale of that statute, it remained the legal duty of the Appellant to substantiate that it had qualified for that protection. For discharging this obligation, the Defendant should have complied with the Orders passed by the learned Single Judge and made good the submission that the proceedings under SICA with relation to the Appellant were pending in a manner such that the benefit of Section 22 of SICA would enure to the Appellant. Secondly, the Appellant should have paid costs imposed upon it; it has, without demur, paid Rupees 33,000/- as Court Fee in this Appeal. Thi
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