The judgment emphasizes the presumption of innocence, the need for substantial and compelling reasons to reverse an acquittal, and the limited interference with findings of fact by the Appellate Court.

JUDGMENT :

1. The petitioner has assailed the order dated 29.4.2014 (hereinafter to be referred as the ‘impugned order’) passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Karkadooma Courts, Delhi (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Appellate Court’) in Crl. Appeal No. 85/2013, whereby the finding returned by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Karkadooma Courts, Delhi (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Trial Court’), vide judgment dated 7.5.2012 in FIR No.325/2000, confirming the acquittal of respondent Nos.2 to 4, has been endorsed, with the prayer to set aside the said impugned order and judgment.

2. Briefly stated, the facts of the present case are that, on 13.10.2000, FIR No. 325/2000, under Sections 452/354/342/323/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the IPC’) was lodged against the respondent Nos.2 to 4, on the basis of a complaint made by the petitioner.

The allegations made by the petitioner in the afore-said complaint are that, on 12.10.2000, at about 10 PM, at H. No. 124, Karkadooma Village, Delhi, the respondent Nos.2 to 4 had committed house trespass and bolted the room of the petitioner’s father-in-law from outside. Thereafter, the respondent Nos.2 to 4 gave beatings to the petitioner and her husband, Sh. Megh Raj with kicks and fists, as a consequence of which the cloth worn by the petitioner was torn. Further, when both the petitioner and her husband raised an alarm, the respondent Nos.2 to 4 ran away, leaving behind a belt and a shirt at the spot.

3. Subsequently, investigation was carried out against the respondent Nos.2 to 4 and after the completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed by the police under Sections 452/354/342/323/34 of the IPC.

4. Thereafter, the Trial Court took cognizance and on 02.05.2001, charges for the offences under Sections 452/342/323/34 of the IPC were framed by the Trial Court, to which the respondent Nos.2 to 4 pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

5. After the completion of the trial, the Trial Court, vide judgment dated 7.5.2012, gave the benefit of doubt to all the three respondents and acquitted them.

6. The Trial Court, in the impugned judgment, observed that the most important witness in the case, i.e., the Investigating Officer (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the IO’) and two more independent witnesses could not be examined by the prosecution despite receiving several opportunities. Further, stark anomalies and contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses were observed by the Trial Court and the injuries sustained by the respondent Nos.2 to 4 were left unexplained. The Trial Court, accordingly, giving the benefit of doubt to the respondent Nos.2 to 4, acquitted them.

7. Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Cr.P.C.’) against the afore-said judgment passed by the Trial Court.

8. The Appellate Court, vide the impugned order dated 29.4.2014, dismissed the appeal of the petitioner and confirmed the acquittal of the respondent Nos. 2 to 4, in the light of the judgment passed by this Court in the case titled Amit Singh Bedi vs. State of NCT of Delhi & Ors., 2012 (2) JCC 901.

9. Aggrieved, the petitioner has preferred the present revision petition.

10. I have heard the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, learned APP for the State and the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 to 4 and perused the record.

11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has addressed arguments mainly on the ground that the Trial Court, as well as the Appellate Court while passing the impugned judgment and order have failed to appreciate the fact that the accused persons ran away, leaving behind the belt and shirt at the spot which have been seized and sealed by the IO from the house of the petitioner proving their culpability in the crime.

12. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that non-examination of the I.O. was not fata