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2019 Supreme(Del) 2100
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
S. MURALIDHAR, TALWANT SINGH, JJ.
Manager, Geeta Bal Bharti Sr. Sec School And Another - Appellant
Versus
Ramesh Chander Dubey And Another - Respondent
Letters Patent Appeal No. 259 of 2009
Decided On : 04-09-2019
Advocate Appeared:
Vikas Mahajan, Adv., Aakash Varma, Adv., Prajesh V.S., Adv., Deepak Goyal, Adv.
The central legal point established in the judgment is that the termination of an employee must be set aside in law before resorting to suspension under Rule 115(4) of the DSE Rules.
Headnote:
Suspension - Employment Termination - Delhi School Education Act, Rule 115(4) - Summary: The court discussed the suspension of an employee under Rule 115(4) of the DSE Rules, emphasizing that suspension can only be resorted to in specific scenarios. The court highlighted the requirement for an enquiry prior to termination for retrospective suspension and the limitations of the Director of Education's power in approving suspension orders. The judgment emphasized that the termination of an employee must be set aside in law before resorting to suspension under Rule 115(4) of the DSE Rules.
Fact of the Case:
The Respondent, a school principal, was terminated from service, and subsequent suspension orders were issued. The Respondent challenged the termination and suspension orders, leading to a legal dispute.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the suspension order was erroneous and set it aside, directing the payment of full back wages to the Respondent from the date of termination. The court dismissed the appeal, emphasizing the legal errors in invoking Rule 115(4) of the DSE Rules for suspension.
Issues: The issues revolved around the legality of the termination and subsequent suspension orders, the applicability of Rule 115(4) of the DSE Rules, and the Director of Education's role in approving suspension orders.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized that suspension under Rule 115(4) of the DSE Rules can only be resorted to in specific scenarios, requiring an enquiry prior to termination for retrospective suspension and limiting the Director of Education's power in approving suspension orders.
Final Decision: The court set aside the suspension order, directed the payment of full back wages to the Respondent, and dismissed the appeal due to legal errors in invoking Rule 115(4) of the DSE Rules for suspension.
JUDGMENT :
S. MURALIDHAR, J.
1. This appeal is directed against a judgment dated 23rd March, 2009 passed by the learned Single Judge allowing W.P.(C) 2189/2004 filed by the Respondent, thereby setting aside an order dated 31st July, 2003 passed by the Appellant i.e. Manager, Geeta Bal Bharti Senior Secondary School ("Appellant No. 1") (hereafter "School") placing the Respondent No. 1 under suspension. The learned Single Judge directed as a consequence that the present Appellant should pay the full back wages to the Respondent No. 1 with effect from 1st April, 2003 till the date of termination after adjusting the subsistence allowance, if any paid, within 1 month from the date of the impugned order.
2. At the outset, it requires to be noticed that on 26th May, 2009 while directing notice to be issued in this appeal, this Court granted an interim stay of the impugned order of the learned Single Judge. Thereafter, the appeal was admitted on 18th May, 2010, while making the aforementioned interim order absolute till the disposal of the appeal. A direction was issued to the Appellants to pay to Respondent No.1 the full wages due till 31st July, 2003 within 2 weeks.
3. The background facts are that Respondent No.1 was appointed as the Principal of Geeta Bal Bharti Senior Secondary School, Delhi by an appointment letter dated 24th April, 1997. His services as Principal were confirmed with effect from 15th May, 1998. The services of Respondent No.1 were terminated by a letter dated 31st March, 2003 issued by the Chairman, Hindu Siksha Samiti Nyas ("Appellant No. 2") in terms of clause 2 of the appointment letter, which permitted discontinuation of the services of Respondent No.1 by giving either 3 months' notice or in lieu of such notice, paying him 3 months' salary.
4. Respondent No.1 challenged the aforementioned termination order before the Director of Education ("DOE"), Respondent No.2. By an order dated 21st April, 2003, DOE quashed the termination order. When despite the above order of the DOE the Appellants did not allow Respondent No.1 to resume duties, he filed a writ petition being C.W.P. 2637/2003 in this Court. In the said petition, the following order was passed on 22nd April, 2003:
"Counsel for the petitioner says that in view of the letter dated 21.4.2003 received by the petitioner whereby the termination order in relation to the services of the petitioner has been quashed by the Director of Education, she insists on prayer clause (b).
Notice to respondents to show cause as to why rule nisi be not issued in terms of prayer clause (b), on filing of process fee regd. AD cover as well as by ordinary process, returnable on 16.7.2003.
Ms. Gupta has contended that in view of the order passed by the Director of Education, the management is not allowing the petitioner to join the school. Let a representation in this regard be made by the petitioner to the Director of Education.
Dasti."
5. The Petitioner then submitted representations on 24th April, 30th April, 13th May and 23rd May, 2003 seeking implementation of the order of the High Court and permitting him to join duty. A separate letter was sent on 2nd June, 2003 to the DOE.
6. Another writ petition being C.W. 3807 of 2003 was filed by Respondent No.1 in this Court for directions to be issued to the present Appellant to allow Respondent No.1 to join duty as Principal of the School. The aforementioned C.W. 3807 of 2003 came up for hearing on 31st July, 2003 and the following order was passed disposing of the said writ petition:
"It is contended by counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner's services were first terminated without following the procedure of law and now he has been suspended. On the other hand, Mr. L.R. Gupta, counsel for respondent/ school says that the Director of Education has granted approval of suspension of the petitioner. Be that as it may, the respondent/school is directed to give subsistence allowance to the petitioner as per law. Counsel for the petitioner h
