The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement for clear, categorical, and unambiguous admissions for a decree to be passed under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC, and the need for caution in invoking such powers.

JUDGMENT :

Navin Chawla, J.

I.A. 12140/2022

1. This application has been filed by the defendant nos. 15 and 16 under Order XII Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (in short, ‘CPC’), claiming dismissal of the suit.

2. Relying upon Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978 (in short, ‘the Delhi Police Act’) it is claimed that as the suit has been filed beyond the period prescribed therein, the suit is liable to be dismissed. In support, reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the defendant nos. 15 and 16 on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sumer Chand v. Union of India (UOI), (1994) 1 SCC 64 : AIR 1993 SC 2579, to submit that as the registration of the FIR, which has been made the cause of action for filing of the present suit by the plaintiff, is a step taken in discharge of duty, the suit for malicious prosecution could have been instituted only within three months from the date of the act complained of. It is further submitted that as far as the defamation is concerned, the Suit could have been filed only within a period of three months from the date of the filing of the Charge-Sheet. In the present case, the FIR was registered on 06.08.2011.; the first Supplementary Charge-Sheet was filed on 11.07.2013.; and the plaintiff was acquitted vide order dated 15.10.2014. of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate. The suit having been filed on 13.10.2015. would, therefore, be barred in terms of Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act.

3. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiff, drawing reference to paragraphs 12 and 24 of the Plaint, submits that the cause of action to file the present Suit had further arisen when the defendant no. 16 had referred to the trial and the FIR against the plaintiff in his reply filed in CS(OS) 379/2015, titled Shri Ved Prakash Yadav v. Shri Y.S. Dadwal The said reply was filed on 17.08.2015.. The present suit having been filed on 13.10.2015., would be within the period of limitation. He submits that in the present Suit, relief is also claimed against defamation of the plaintiff. He submits that filing of pleadings in a case can also give rise to a cause of action for a claim of defamation. In support of this plea, he places reliance on the judgment dated 15.02.2022. passed in CS (OS) 649/2021, titled Dr. Sanjiv Bansal v. Dr. Manish Bansal.

4. He fairly submits that as against the defendant no. 15, the suit would be barred by limitation.

5. In rejoinder, the learned counsel for the defendant nos. 15 and 16 submits that the mere reference to an FIR in the written statement filed in another suit cannot give rise to a cause of action for defamation. The defendant no. 16 had filed the written statement in defence to a suit and, therefore, was entitled to make reference to the FIR, which is a matter of fact. He places reliance on the judgment of this Court in B.C. Rana v. Seema Katoch, CS(OS) 503/2009, to submit that there will be an absolute privilege in averments made in the course of judicial proceedings. The same, in any case, cannot be made the basis of a cause of action.

6. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties.

7. At the outset it is noticed that the defendant nos. 15 and 16 have not filed their written statement to the suit. Their right to file the written statement stands closed by the order dated 29.08.2016. passed by the learned Joint Registrar (Judicial). Though the said order is in challenge in O.A. 57/2022, the fact remains that in absence of a written statement, it is only the averments made in the plaint that can be considered at this stage.

8. The plaintiff has made the following averments in paragraphs 12 and 24 of the Plaint, which are reproduced hereinbelow:—

“12. That because of the defendant's deliberate, intentional and malicious intention, the above said FIR was registered, malicious prosecution started, the plaintiff was humiliated, tortured and beaten up illegally and without power and authority by the police officials at th