Contempt action should proceed only for established willful disobedience of a court order, and the correctness of an order can only be addressed in appeal jurisdiction, not in a contempt petition.

JUDGMENT

Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora, J. The present contempt petition has been filed stating that the Respondent, Addl. Distt. Magistrate/Collector (West), has not complied with the order dated 20.03.2012 passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in W.P. (C) 5095/2011, whereby this Court directed as under:

"11. Such a casual approach of the authorities concerned in condoning inordinate delay cannot be countenanced. Indiscretion exercised in casually condoning the delay renders the impugned order (Annexure-A) as well as the appellate order (Annexure-F) unsustainable in law. Consequently, impugned order (Annexure-A) as well as appellate order (Annexure-I) are set aside and the mutation order of 29th November, 1990 (Annexure-B) is restored with the direction to the Additional Collector (West) to decide application of respondent-Rattan Singh, seeking condonation of delay afresh in accordance with the law."

(Emphasis supplied)

2. The Petitioner herein is aggrieved by the order dated 20.01.2017 passed by the Respondent in pursuance to the remand issued by this Court vide its order dated 20.03.2012. In this petition, the Petitioner, in addition to seeking initiation of contempt proceedings is also seeking setting aside of the order dated 20.01.2017 (`impugned order') and a direction to the Petitioner to re-decide the application seeking condonation of delay.

3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner states that the Respondent has not complied with the order dated 20.03.2012 of this Court inasmuch as the Respondent while passing the impugned order dated 20.01.2017, ignored the observations made and directions issued by this Court and has erroneously relied upon the earlier order dated 12.12.2007 passed by the Addl. Collector (West) and order dated 17.02.2011 passed by the Financial Commissioner. He states that the Respondent while passing the said impugned order has acted as an appellate Court above this Court and has not only upheld the orders dated 12.12.2007 and 17.02.2011, but virtually set aside the order dated 20.03.2012 passed by this Court.

3.1. He states that a property measuring (0-9 bighas), bearing Khasra No. 3047/731, Village Basai Darapur, Delhi (`subject property') was mutated in the name of the Petitioner vide order dated 30.11.1990, on the basis of a Will. He further states that necessary changes to the said effect were made in Jamabandi maintained by the Revenue department.

3.2. He states that the said mutation order dated 30.11.1990, was belatedly challenged by one Mr. Rattan Singh, who preferred an appeal dated 27.02.2005, under Section 64 of Delhi Land Revenue Act, 1954 (`DLR Act'), after a delay of about 14 years and 3 months. He further states that Mr. Rattan Singh had also filed an application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal. He states that initially the Addl. Collector vide its order dated 12.12.2007, set aside the mutation order dated 30.11.1990 and directed the concerned RA/SDM (Patel Nagar) to decide the case, after affording proper opportunity of being heard to both the parties.

3.3. He states that the Petitioner being aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, preferred an appeal before the Financial Commissioner of Delhi, seeking setting aside of the order dated 12.12.2007, however, the said appeal was dismissed by the Financial Commissioner vide its order dated 17.02.2011 in case No. 49/2008/CA.

3.4. He states that in the writ petition filed before this Court, challenging the said orders dated 12.12.2007 and 17.02.2011, this Court observed that neither the order dated 12.12.2007, nor the order dated 17.02.2011, has adequately dealt with the delay aspect in its correct perspective. He states that the Court set aside the said orders dated 12.12.2007 and 17.02.2011 and remanded the matter to the Respondent herein to decide the application of Mr. Rattan Singh seeking condonation of delay, afresh in accordance with the law.

3.5. He states that however, the Respondent herein on remand passed the impu