Violations of interim orders should be viewed strictly to maintain the rule of law, and the court should send a deterrent message to counterfeiters.

JUDGMENT

I.A. 15066/2022 (under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the CPC) in CS(COMM) 469/2021

1. Interlocutory orders of injunction are passed by this Court, on a daily basis, in intellectual property matters. The Court finds itself faced, in several such cases, with applications under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), by plaintiffs complaining that the defendants have violated the interim order of injunction. In many such cases - as in the present - the allegation is found to be true. The violation, however, generally stops on or before the date when the court issues notice on the application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A. The plaintiff, however, insists, and not without justification, that the defendant cannot be let off. A violator, asserts the plaintiff, is a violator, and deserves to be punished. The Supreme Court echoes this sentiment, in para 54 of Surya Vadanan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2015) 5 SCC 450:

"54. As has been held in Arathi Bandi v. Bandi Jagadrakshaka Rao, (2013) 15 SCC 790, a violation of an interim or an interlocutory order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction ought to be viewed strictly if the rule of law is to be maintained. No litigant can be permitted to defy or decline adherence to an interim or an interlocutory order of a court merely because he or she is of the opinion that that order is incorrect--that has to be judged by a superior court or by another court having jurisdiction to do so. It is in this context that the observations of this Court in Sarita Sharma v. Sushil Sharma, (2000) 3 SCC 14, and Ruchi Majoo v. Sanjeev Majoo, (2011) 6 SCC 479, have to be appreciated. If as a general principle, the violation of an interim or an interlocutory order is not viewed seriously, it will have widespread deleterious effects on the authority of courts to implement their interim or interlocutory orders or compel their adherence."

Order XXXIX Rule 2A vis-a-vis contempt of court

2. There is a divergence of opinion, in judgments of the Supreme Court, on whether Order XXXIX Rule 2A confers, or does not confer, a power of contempt, and also, therefore, whether the disobedience which would invite punitive action under the said provision has necessarily to be willful. Food Corporation of India v. Sukh Deo Prasad, (2009) 5 SCC 665 and U.C. Surendranath v. Mambally's Bakery, (2019) 20 SCC 666 hold in the affirmative, thus:

Food Corporation of India (supra):

"38. The power exercised by a court under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code is punitive in nature, akin to the power to punish for civil contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The person who complains of disobedience or breach has to clearly make out beyond any doubt that there was an injunction or order directing the person against whom the application is made, to do or desist from doing some specific thing or act and that there was disobedience or breach of such order. While considering an application under Order 39 Rule 2-A, the court cannot construe the order in regard to which disobedience/breach is alleged, as creating an obligation to do something which is not mentioned in the `order', on surmises, suspicions and inferences. The power under Rule 2-A should be exercised with great caution and responsibility."

U.C. Surendranath (supra):

"7. For finding a person guilty of wilful disobedience of the order under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC there has to be not mere `disobedience' but it should be a `wilful disobedience'. The allegation of wilful disobedience being in the nature of criminal liability, the same has to be proved to the satisfaction of the court that the disobedience was not mere `disobedience' but a `wilful disobedience'. As pointed out earlier, during the second visit of the Commissioner to the appellant's shop, tea cakes and masala cakes were being sold without any wrappers/labels. The only thing which the Commissioner has noted is that "non-removal of the hoarding" displayed in front of the appellant's shop for which the a