JUDGMENT

Vibhu Bakhru, J.

1. The petitioners have filed the present petition impugning orders dated 06.02.2017 and 09.02.2017 passed by the Income Tax Settlement Commission (hereafter `the Commission') under Section 245D(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereafter `the Act'), to the limited extent that the settlement applications filed by the petitioners under Section 245C(1) of the Act were held to be invalid for the Assessment Years 2012-13 and 2013-14.

2. The impugned order dated 06.02.2017 was passed pursuant to the applications filed by petitioner nos. 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 and the impugned order dated 09.02.2017 is in respect of the applications filed by petitioner no.2. The Commission has held that in terms of Sub-clause (iv) of Clause (b) of Section 245A of the Act, the assessment proceedings in respect of the Assessment Years 2012-13 and 2013-14, were concluded. And, there was no `case' existing in respect of the Assessment Years 2012-13 and 2013-14. Consequently, the applications for settlement of case(s) under Section 245C of the Act, in respect of those Assessment Years, was not maintainable.

3. In terms of Section 245C(1) of the Act, an assessee is entitled to make an application for settlement "at any stage of a case relating to him". Thus, the question that falls for consideration of this Court is whether there was a case (or cases) relating to the petitioners, in respect of the Assessment Years 2012-13 and 2013-14.

4. Briefly stated, the controversy arises in the following context:

4.1. The petitioners had filed their respective applications under Section 245C(1) of the Act on 15.12.2016 in respect of the Assessment Years 2012-13 to 2016-17. The Commission passed an order dated 22.12.2016 under Section 245D(1) of the Act, allowing the applications to proceed in respect of the Assessment Years 2012-13 to 2016-17. The Commission also called for reports under Section 245D(2B) from the concerned Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (hereafter `Pr. CIT') on the question of (i) the validity of the applications for the relevant years; (ii) the correctness and adequacy of the additional tax paid by the petitioners; and (iii) the compliance as required under Section 245C(4) of the Act.

4.2. The concerned Pr. CIT furnished reports dated 23.01.2017 and 24.01.2017, which were received by the Commission on 25.01.2017. The Pr. CIT objected to the applications on two grounds. First, that the petitioners had not made a full and true disclosure as they had not disclosed the expenditure incurred by way of commission to brokers for procuring bogus short-term capital loss and long-term capital gains for reduction of the tax liability. They estimated that the petitioners would have paid commission at the rate of 2% of the short-term capital loss. Second, that there was no case in respect of the assessment years other than Assessment Year 2014-15, for which notice under Section 143(2) of the Act had been issued by the Assessing Officer.

5. Insofar as full and true disclosure is concerned, the Commission did not accept that the said objection was made out at that stage. The Commission noted that the petitioners had also disclosed the expenditure incurred on booking of short-term capital losses. It observed that the objection, to the effect that an expenditure of 2% of the short-term capital loss would have been incurred and met out of undisclosed income, was presumptuous and not founded on any material evidence. In addition, the Commission was of the view that the Income Tax Authorities were not precluded from making the necessary enquiries at an appropriate stage after seeking permission from the Commission.

6. Insofar as the existence of a case is concerned, the Commission found that in respect of the Assessment Years 2015-16 and 2016-17, the period of two years from the end of the relevant assessment year had not elapsed. Therefore, in terms of Clause (iv) of the Explanation to Clause (b) of Section 245A of the Act, assessment p