The court emphasized the strict timelines prescribed in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and the Limitation Act, and held that delays beyond the statutory periods cannot be condoned.

JUDGMENT

Manoj Kumar Ohri, J. By way of the present appeal filed under Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with Section 151 CPC, the appellant seeks setting aside of the judgment dated 18.11.2017 in ARB 32/2017 whereby the application filed by the appellant under Section 39 Rule 3 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act and Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay in re-filing the petition came to be dismissed.

2. Learned counsel for the appellant while assailing the impugned order contended that the trial court failed to appreciate the facts and the explanation provided in the application and passed the impugned order on mere technicalities.

3. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has contended that not only there was delay of 287 days in re-filing the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act even the present appeal is filed after a delay of nearly 327 days.

4. A perusal of the records would show that the respondent had filed a claim wherein it was awarded a work of replacement of undersized sewers in Model Town, Delhi, Civil Line Zone vide Award dated 25.10.2002. The said work was to start from 03.11.2002 and to be completed within 15 months from the date of start. The dispute arose as the appellant failed to provide with the requisite permissions, resulting in filing of statement of the claim. Vide award dated 15.09.2006, the claim was allowed. The appellant filed objections under Section 34 of the Act however, the same were returned to the appellant for removal of defects on 16.12.2006. The petition was re-filed on 14.01.2006 however, the defects were not removed. The appellant filed an application under Section 39 Rule 3 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay of 287 days in re-filing the petition. It was averred that after filing of the petition, the appellant's counsel had to go outstation on account of demise of his uncle in Ambala (Haryana) and because of the fact that the uncle had no son, the appellant could come only in the first week of February, 2007. It was also stated that the counsel's clerk inadvertently tagged the file with another case. It is only when the contractor approached the appellant's office in September, 2007, it came to their knowledge that the objections were not listed on account of the defects. The trial court while noting the conduct of the appellant dismissed the application. It was observed that the appellant failed to provide any sufficient ground for condonation of delay in re-filing. It was observed that the explanation provided by the appellant was mere negligence.

5. Even the present appeal is accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking codonation of delay of 327 days. In the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it has been stated that after pronouncement of the decision on 18.11.2017, the certified copy was applied on 21.11.2017 and the same was received on 24.11.2017. As the appellant sought legal opinion, it took some time in taking administrative decisions and seeking approval of the Competent Authority which took substantial time and thereafter the file was handed over to the counsel on 09.10.2018 for preparing the appeal. It took some time in drafting the appeal which eventually came to be filed on 09.01.2019.

6. Earlier in M/s Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India [reported as the Supreme Court observed as under:

"13. A plain reading of sub-section (3) along with the proviso to Section 34 of the 1996 Act, shows that the application for setting aside the award on the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 34 could be made within three months and the period can only be extended for a further period of thirty days on showing sufficient cause and not thereafter. The use of the words "but not thereafter" in the proviso makes it clear that the extension cannot