JUDGMENT

1. The appellant filed a suit for recovery of Rs.4,69,000/- under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure against the respondent, which was dismissed on 7th January, 2010 by the Trial Court for non-prosecution. The appellant filed an application under Order IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure for restoration which was dismissed by the Trial Court on 29th November, 2010. The application for review of the order dated 29th November, 2010 was also dismissed on 18th December, 2010.

2. The appellant filed an appeal against the order dated 29th November, 2010 which was dismissed by this Court on 25th February, 2011. The appellant filed SLP (C) No.16186/2011 (which was converted into Civil Appeal No. 7220/2014) against the order dated 25th February, 2011 in which the Supreme Court vide order dated 25th February, 2011 remanded the matter back to this Court for consideration of appeal on merits.

3. The law with respect to the condonation of delay is well settled. The approach has to be liberal and judicious guided by the paramount consideration of not depriving a litigant ordinarily of adjudication of rights on merits. Hypertechnical, too strict, and pedantic approach may cause injustice that has to be avoided.

4. In Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, [1955] 2 SCR 1, the Supreme Court held that the Code of procedure is designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it.

5. In Jai Jai Ram Manoharlal v. National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon, [1970] 1 SCR 22, the Supreme Court held that the rules of procedure are intended to be a handmaid to the administration of justice and party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the rules of procedure.

6. In Union of India v. Ram Charan (Deceased), [1964] 3 SCR 467, the Supreme Court observed that the provisions of the Code are with a view to advance the cause of justice. Of course, the Court, in considering whether the appellant has established sufficient cause for his not continuing the suit in time or for not applying for the setting aside of the abatement within time, need not be over-strict in expecting such proof of the suggested cause as it would accept for holding certain fact established, both because the question does not relate to the merits of the dispute between the parties and because if the abatement is set aside, the merits of the dispute can be determined while, if the abatement is not set aside, the appellant is deprived of proving his claim on account of his culpable negligence or lack of vigilance.

7. In Bhag Singh v. Major Daljit Singh, 1987 SCC (Supp) (1) 685, reiterating the law laid down earlier by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Ram Charan, (supra) the Supreme Court held that the Court while considering an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act will consider the facts and circumstances not for taking too strict and pedantic stand which will cause injustice but to consider it from the point of taking a view which will advance the cause of justice.

8. In G. Ramegowda v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, AIR 1988 SC 897, the Supreme Court observed that the expression `sufficient cause' in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay.

9. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353, t