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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Asha Menon, J.
Ravi Vansha Narayan Mathur - Appellant
Versus
State - Respondent
W.P. (Crl.) 2488 of 2016, Crl. M.A. 13135 of 2016 (for stay)
Decided On : 17-08-2022




Criminal jurisdiction is restricted to the area where the offence occurred, and parties cannot confer jurisdiction through a contract; thus, allegations of fraud in a lease agreement without evidence of criminal intent do not warrant an FIR.

Headnote:(A) Constitution of India - Article 226 - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - The petitioners challenged the order directing police investigation into their alleged involvement in a fraudulent lease agreement, asserting lack of jurisdiction and absence of criminal intent. The petition was based on a commercial lease executed despite a restraint order from the Debt Recovery Tribunal, which the petitioners claimed was with mala fide intentions. The court found no essential ingredients of an offence disclosed in the FIR, and that the matter was primarily a civil dispute. (Paras 10, 22, 32, 35)

(B) Jurisdiction - The legal principle identified is that the jurisdiction of criminal courts is determined by the local area where the offence is committed, and a party cannot confer jurisdiction on a criminal court through contract. The FIR lacked substance as the alleged crime occurred outside the jurisdiction of the court in question. (Paras 30, 34)

Facts of the case:
The case involved a lease agreement for a hotel property executed by the respondent company amidst an ongoing debt situation with the State Bank, leading to allegations of fraud by the petitioners after the lease was executed.

Findings of Court:
The High Court concluded that the FIR did not disclose a cognizable offence and quashed both the order and the FIR, recognizing that the case was a civil matter rather than a criminal one.

Issues: The main issues included the jurisdiction of the Delhi Magistrate regarding an FIR and whether the allegations in the FIR constituted a cognizable offence.

Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that the FIR should be quashed due to the absence of essential ingredients of the alleged offences and highlighted that the allegations appeared to be a malicious attempt to harass the petitioners, compounded by parallel investigations in multiple jurisdictions.

Result: The petition was allowed, the impugned order quashed, and the FIR along with all related investigations was also quashed.

Table of Content
1. facts regarding the lease of property and alleged deceit. (Para 2 , 6 , 8)
2. jurisdictional issues regarding fir registration. (Para 10 , 11 , 16)
3. malice in initiating criminal proceedings. (Para 15 , 32 , 34)
4. court's authority and criteria for quashing fir. (Para 19 , 26 , 33)
5. final decision to quash the fir. (Para 35 , 36)

JUDGMENT

1. This petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the order dated 14th March, 2016 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate-03 (for short, `MM'), South District, Saket, Delhi.

2. The facts as are relevant for the disposal of the present petition are that the petitioners and respondent No.2 entered into a commercial transaction where under the petitioners had leased out a property at Jaisalmer. The petitioner No.1 was a partner in the partnership firm by the name of M/s SRM Heritage Jaisalmer having its registered office at Mumbai. The petitioner No.2 was working as the Chief Development Officer of the partnership firm at the relevant time. The respondent No.2 is the Director of M/s JAH Developers Pvt. Ltd. (`company') alongwith two other Directors, Mrs. Jaswanti Panwar (wife of respondent No.2) and their son Mr. Anuj Panwar. This company had constructed a hotel situated at Plot Nos.14, 15 & 16, Barmer Road, Jaisalmer known as Hotel Jaisal Villas in the year 2009, apparently taking a huge loan from the State Bank of India. It is this property that was taken on lease by the petitioners through Lease Deed dated 6th September, 2013.

3. It is the contention of the petitioner that this Lease Deed was executed on 6th September, 2013 by the respondent No.2 despite being aware of a restraint order upon them issued by the Debt Recovery Tribunal (`DRT') on a plea of the State Bank of India (`Bank') from whom the company had borrowed a heavy amount and after its account had become a Non Performing Asset (NPA). Apparently, the loan was taken on a mortgage of the land on which the hotel premises were constructed. Thus, according to the petitioners, it was with mala fide intentions that the Lease Deed (Annexure P-1) was executed by the respondent no.2 and his company, for a period of 9 years, with a `lock-in period' of three years.

4. As the account of the company had become NPA, the Bank issued a notice on 17th December, 2013 along with the legal notice dated 20th May, 2013 setting out these facts, as also that the company had borrowed Rs.17 Crores from the Bank and the hotel was on a mortgage with it. A notice under Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act (for short, `SARFAESI Act.), 2002 had also been issued. When a clarification was sought from Mr. Anuj Panwar, the petitioner was assured that the matter would be settled with the Bank.

5. However, instead of doing that, they referred the matter to a Sole Arbitrator. It was at that juncture that the petitioners filed a case under the Rajasthan Rent Control Act before the Rent Control Authority, Jaisalmer for protection against dispossession. Subsequently, the company filed a complaint under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (for short, `A&C' Act), 1996 read with Order VII Rule XI CPC for dismissal of the rent petition. That application was rejected by the Rent Tribunal on 15th July, 2014 while at the same time, the Sole Arbitrator rejected the objection raised by the petitioner and decided to continue with the arbitral proceedings. The company also filed a petition under Section 9 of the A&C Act, which was still pending. Subsequently, since the Sole Arbitrator withdrew from the arbitration proceedings, the said proceedings stood terminated under Section 25 of the A&C Act. It may be mentioned that a second arbitrator was appointed later, but no award was passed.

6. It is the case of the petitioners that the respondent No.2 and the company had not disclosed abo

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