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2026 Supreme(Del) 581
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar, J.
M/S India Glycols Limited - Petitioner
Versus
M/S VRV Foods Limited - Respondent
ARB.P. 441 of 2026
Decided On : 21-05-2026
For the Petitioner:Mr. Gautam Dhamija, Advocate.
For the Respondent:Mr. Param Kumar Mishra, Mr. Krishnam Mishra, Mr. Chetan Wahi and Mr. Jagjeet Kumar Bhatt, Advocates.
The court's power to appoint an arbitrator is limited to a prima facie verification of the existence of an arbitration agreement, precluding any detailed adjudication of factual or legal disputes, which are reserved for the Arbitral Tribunal to ensure minimal judicial intervention.
Headnote:(A) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Sections 11(6), 11(6-A) - Appointment of Arbitrator - Scope of judicial scrutiny - Court at the referral stage must limit its examination to the prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement - Contested factual or legal issues are within the exclusive competence of the Arbitral Tribunal - Court's role is facilitative to ensure adherence to the parties' agreed dispute resolution mechanism and to preserve arbitral autonomy. (Paras 5, 6, 7)
(B) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 8 vs. Section 11 - Distinction in scope of judicial intervention - While Section 8 allows for a prima facie examination of both existence and validity, Section 11 is strictly confined to the prima facie examination of the existence of the agreement - Legislative intent prioritizes minimal judicial interference and expeditious resolution. (Paras 5, 112, 127)
Facts of the case:
The petitioner approached the court for the appointment of a sole arbitrator pursuant to manufacturing agreements. Both parties expressed consent to the referral of existing disputes to arbitration.
Findings of Court:
The court held that the referral court's function is purely procedural and aimed at facilitating arbitration, noting that any deep inquiry into factual or legal merit as a preliminary step would conflict with the principle of minimum judicial intervention.
Issues: The central issue was the determination of the scope and standard of judicial scrutiny required by the court while exercising powers to appoint an arbitrator under the relevant legislative provisions.
Ratio Decidendi: The court affirmed that the scope of inquiry is limited to assessing the prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement, preventing the court from venturing into contested issues of law or fact which fall within the domain of the arbitrator.
Result: Petition allowed; Sole Arbitrator appointed.
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. establishing prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement. (Para 1 , 2 , 3) |
| 2. parties' consensus on resorting to arbitration. (Para 4) |
| 3. defining the limited scope of judicial scrutiny under section 11(6). (Para 5 , 6) |
| 4. referral of disputes to arbitration pursuant to agreement. (Para 7) |
| 5. financial valuation of the dispute. (Para 8) |
| 6. procedural appointment of arbitrator and final court disposal. (Para 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15) |
JUDGMENT :
Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar, J.
1. The present Petition, filed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996[Act], seeks the appointment of a Sole Arbitrator in terms of Agreements for Tie-UP Manufacture of IMFL Products dated 31.03.2015 and 31.03.2017 (subsequent renewals of the Agreement dated 31.03.2017)[Agreements ]for the purpose of resolution of disputes inter se the parties.
2. The Dispute Resolution clause being Clause 32 as set out in the said Agreements reads as under:
“32. Any dispute or difference between the parties hereto concerning anything contained in or arising out of this agreement or as to the rights, duties or liabilities hereunder of the parties hereto shall be referred to the arbitration of two arbitrators one to be appointed by each party in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, or any statutory modifications or re-enactment thereof for the time being in force and such arbitration proceedings shall take place at New Delhi and subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the courts at New Delhi.”
3. The material on record indicates that the Petitioner herein invoked arbitration in terms of Section 21 of the Act vide legal notice dated 21.11.2025.
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent submits that he has no objection to the disputes as between the parties being referred to adjudication by way of Arbitration.
5. At this juncture, this Court deems it apposite to note that the legal position governing the scope and standard of judicial scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the Act is no longer res integra. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning , (2024) 12 SCC 1, after taking into consideration the authoritative pronouncement of the seven-Judge Bench in Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC 1, comprehensively delineated the contours of judicial intervention at the stage of Section 11 of the Act. The excerpt of Krish Spg (supra) reads as under:-
“(c) Judicial interference under the 1996 Act
110. The parties have been conferred with the power to decide and agree on the procedure to be adopted for appointing arbitrators. In cases where the agreed upon procedure fails, the courts have been vested with the power to appoint arbitrators upon the request of a party, to resolve the deadlock between the parties in appointing the arbitrators.
111. Section 11 of the 1996 Act is provided to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties to settle their disputes by arbitration in situations where the parties fail to appoint an arbitrator(s). The parameters of judicial review laid down for Section 8 differ from those prescribed for Section 11. The view taken in SBP & Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618 and affirmed in Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 that Sections 8 and 11, respectively, of the 1996 Act are complementary in nature was legislatively overruled by the introduction of Section 11(6-A) in 2015. Thus, although both these provisions intend to compel parties to abide by their mutual intention to arbitrate, yet the scope of powers conferred upon the courts under both the sections are different.
112. The difference between Sections 8 and 11, respectively, of the 1996 Act is also evident from the scope of these provisions. Some of these differences are:
112.1. While Section 8 empowers any “judicial authority” to refer t
