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HARYANA STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES
REDRESSAL COMMISSION, CHANDIGARH
Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.S. Sandhawalia, President;
Mr. Tikka Singh, Member
HOUSING BOARD, HARYANA––Appellant
versus
DR. S.L. CHAUDHARY & OTHERS––Respondents
First Appeal No. 13 of 1990—Decided on 13.11.1990

Advocates:
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant :Mr. V.K. Vashishta, Advocate.

An autonomous Board or Corporation is not entitled to any different treatment than a private party for the purposes of condonation of delay under the proviso to Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Headnote:

CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 1986 - SECTION 15 - LIMITATION ACT, 1963 - SECTION 5 - CONDONATION OF DELAY - AUTONOMOUS BOARD OR CORPORATION - NO DIFFERENT FOOTING THAN PRIVATE PARTY - EXPLANATION OF DELAY DAY BY DAY REQUIRED.

Fact of the Case:

The appellant-Board filed an appeal against the order of the District Forum 30 days beyond the period prescribed under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The appellant-Board filed an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the appellant-Board was not entitled to any different treatment than a private party for the purposes of condonation of delay under the proviso to Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The court further held that the appellant-Board had not explained the delay day by day and, therefore, the application for condonation of delay was dismissed.

Issues: Whether an autonomous Board or Corporation is on a different footing than a private party, for seeking condonation of delay in filing an appeal under the proviso to Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the language of the proviso to Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is in pari materia with the language of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, the principles underlying the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would equally govern those under the proviso to Section 15 of the Act. The court further held that the appellant-Board had not explained the delay day by day and, therefore, the application for condonation of delay was dismissed.

Final Decision: The appeal of the Board was dismissed because of the bar of limitation.

ORDER

S.S. Sandhawalia, President.—Whether an autonomous Board or Corporation is on a different footing than a private party, for seeking condonation of delay in filing an appeal under the proviso to Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, is the significant threshold question in this case.

2. Since this appeal must founded on the bed-rock of the bar of limitation, it suffices to notice the relevant facts to the said issue alone. The respondent-Dr. S.L. Chaudhary had preferred a complaint before the District Forum, Hissar, claiming a variety or reliefs against the appellant-Board, pertaining to the allotment of premises under its High Income Group Scheme at Hissar. By its order dated the 14th May, 1990, the District Forum directed the payment of Rs. 6,417/- by the appellant to the respondent.

3. On the appellant’s own showing, a copy of the detailed order aforesaid of the District Forum was duly dispatched and received in the office of the Board on the 8th June, 1990. However, the present appeal against the said order has been preferred on the 9th August. 1990, admittedly 30 days beyond the period prescribed under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act. 1986 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). Along with the appeal. an application expressly under Section 5 of the T-imitation Act, for the condonation of delay, has been filed on behalf of the appellant-Board. In support thereof an affidavit of Shri S.P. Gupta, Chief Engineer, Housing Board, Haryana, has been attached. The somewhat bald and cryptic averments in the said affidavit are to the effect that after the order of the District Forum was pronounced, the papers were sent to the concerned officer at Chandigarh in the Head Office of the appellant-Board, for scrutiny and opinion. Thereafter sanction to file an appeal was taken from the competent authority, and, as such, in this process, the appeal could not be filed within limitation and a delay of 30 days was occasioned.

4. Mr. V.K. Vashishta. learned counsel for the appellant, while pressing his application for condonation, had attempted to argue that the appellant herein being an autonomous Board, it had to go through a long process of practice and procedure in filing appeals. On these premises, he contended that the. appellant-Board should be treated on a footing more favorable than the ordinary litigant for condoning the delay.

5. In appraising the aforesaid submission, we would wish to notice at the very outset that even though the application for condonation makes no mention, whatsoever of any provision under the Act, it is somewhat plain that herein in the context of the special law pertaining to the protection of consumers, the material and relevant provision is Section 15 of the Act alone. The said provision prescribes both the period within which the appeal is to be preferred and the proviso thereto empowers the State Commission to entertain appeals beyond the same for sufficient cause. The matter, therefore, has necessarily to be governed by the said provisions, we do not herein wish to enter into the intricate and ticklish questions as to whether the said Section 15 of the Act would be deemed to expressly exclude all the provisions of the Limitation Act or whether the Commission is a Court within the meaning of Section 5 thereof. Eschewing all hyper-technicalities, we world with some liberality entertain the application of the appellant-Board, as one under both the provisions of law, which may be attracted.

6. Since the whole issue herein revolves around Section 15 of the Act, and in particular, the proviso thereto, it is apt to notice the said provision in exten so:

“ 15. Appeal.- Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order, in such form and manner as may be prescribed: Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thi

















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