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RAJASTHAN CONSUMER DISPUTES
REDRESSAL COMMISSION, JAIPUR
Honble Mr. Justice S.K.M. Lodha, President;
Damodar Thanvi & Mrs. Saria khan, Members
DAMODAR SWAROOP CHANDEL, JAIPUR––Appellant
versus
HINDUSTAN MOTORS THROUGH WESTERN MOTORS, JAIPUR––Respondent
Complaint Case No. 2/89—Decided on 10.8.1989
For the Appellant :Mr. Deshbandhu Kheda, Advocate.
For the Respondents:Smt. Malini Sood & Alok Sharma, Advocates.
A complaint under Section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is subject to the limitation period prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963.
Headnote:
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 1986 - LIMITATION - SECTION 12 - Complaint under Section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is dismissed as time-barred. The Act is conspicuously silent with regard to the limitation. The residuary Article 113 of the Limitation Act is applicable in this case. The purchase of mini bus by the complainant from the opposite-party was a contract of sale. Any claim for damages and compensation which has arisen out of the said contract of sale had become time barred under Art. 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 much before coming into force of the Act.
Fact of the Case:
The complainant purchased a Hindustan T-180 Mini bus chassis from the opposite-party's sales agent in 1982. The complainant alleged that the mini bus suffered from many mechanical defects and was unfit for use. He filed a complaint under Section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, seeking a refund of the purchase price, expenses for repairs, and interest on a loan borrowed from the bank.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the complaint was time-barred under the Limitation Act, 1963. The court noted that the Act is silent with regard to limitation and that the residuary Article 113 of the Limitation Act is applicable in this case. The court found that the purchase of the mini bus was a contract of sale and that any claim for damages and compensation arising out of the contract had become time-barred under Article 113 much before the Act came into force.
Issues: Whether the complaint was time-barred under the Limitation Act, 1963.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the complaint was time-barred because the purchase of the mini bus was a contract of sale and any claim for damages and compensation arising out of the contract had become time-barred under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 much before the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 came into force.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the complaint as time-barred.
Mr. Justice S.K.M. Lodha, President—This Complaint under Sec. 12 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (Act No. 68 of 1986) which for the sake of brevity be hereinafter referred to as "the Act") was originally filed by the complainant against the opposite-party and Western Indian Motors, M.I. Road, Jaipur. At the request of the complainant, name of the Western Indian Motors, M.I. Road, Jaipur was deleted.
Subsequently the complainant submitted an application that the Western Indian Motors, M.I. Road, Jaipur may be impleaded as a party to the complaint. He, however, stated on 11.4.89 that he does not want to press the application. Now the opposite-party Hindustan Motors is before us. The complainant has averred that he purchased one Hindustan T-180 Mini bus chassis from their sales agent. Western Indian Motors on 30.1.82 for Rs. 1,54,000/-. According to him the mini bus purchased suffered from many mechanical defects and it was unfit for use. He has mentioned the defects in paras 3, 4 & 5 of the complaint. In view of the conclusion to which we have arrived at, it is not necessary to detail the defects pointed out by the complainant. The complainant has prayed that the opposite-party may be directed to refund the price of the bus chassis Rs. 1,54,000/- expenses for repairs amounting to Rs. 1,00,000/- and interest on the loan borrowed by him from the Bank which is to the tune of Rs. 2,00,000/-. In all he has claimed Rs. 44,000/- from the opposite-party. The complainant filed some documents with the complaint with which we are not concerned at present. The opposite-party by its version of the case which was filed on June 25, 1989, resisted the complaint on various grounds. It raised four preliminary objections. The two main preliminary objections taken by the opposite-party are:
(1) that the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is not applicable to this case i.e. to the complaint filed by the complainant, for, the cause of action for the complaint arose in 1982 (the chassis of the bus was purchased according to the complainant on 30.1.82).
(2) that the complaint as instituted is hopelessly time-barred as the cause of action arose in 1982 and the complaint was filed as late as on Feb. 21,1989. The averment in this regard is that under the Limitation Act, 1963 the complainant could not institute a suit for damages/compensation in regard to the mini bus chassis in 1989 and so for that matter he cannot invoke the provisions of the Act for the purpose of filing the complaint. On merits it was submitted that the bus was not unsuitable for carrying passengers after a body was put on it. On the basis of the warranty which was given to the complainant, it was stated that the defects under warranty, if any, were duly attended as and when they were brought to the notice. A plea was raised that the chassis of mini bus was purchased more than seven years before the filing of the complaint and as such at the time when the complaint was filed whatever was said in regard to the defects and unfitness of the bus, they were beyond the terms and conditions of the warranty. Reply was filed by the complainant contravening the pleas raised by the opposite-party in its version of the case. Preliminary objections were also denied. In support of the complaint, the complainant filed his affidavit and besides that affidavits of Sarva Shri Kajor Mal Mehra, Deshbandu Kheda, Krishan Kumar Kharbanda and Pramod Gulati were also submitted. The complainant was cross-examined on his affidavit. Other deponents of the affidavits were not cross-examined. The opposite-party did not lead any evidence.
2. We have heard Shri Deshbandu Kheda, authorised representative of the complain- ant. We have also heard Smt. Malini Sood, Advocate for the opposite-party. After hearing the parties, we have come to the conclusion that his complaint should be dismissed as barred by time and, therefore, we do not propose to go into the other preliminary objections and the merits of the case. C
