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HARYANA STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES
REDRESSAL COMMISSION, CHANDIGARH
Honble Mr. Justice S.S. Sandhawalia, President;
Basanti Devi, Member; Tikka Singh, Member
HARYANA AGRO INDUSTRIES CORP. LTD.––Appellant
versus
VIRENDER PAL SINGH & ANR.––Respondents
First Appeal No. 2 of 1991—Decided on 25.3.1991

Advocates:
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant :Mr. Rajesh Garg, Advocate.
For the Respondent No. 1:Mr. D.D. Gupta, Advocate.
For the Respondent No. 2:Mr. A.S. Malik, Advocate.
For the Respondent No. 3:Mr. J.S. Duhan, Advocate.

An appeal under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, must be filed within the prescribed period of 30 days and any delay in filing the appeal must be condoned by the court for sufficient cause.

Headnote:

CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 1986 - SECTION 15 - LIMITATION - APPEAL - DELAY - CONDONATION - SUFFICIENT CAUSE - VIOLATION OF STATUTORY RULE - NO AGGRIEVEMENT - DISMISSAL OF APPEAL.

Fact of the Case:

The appellant, Haryana Agro Industries Corporation Limited, filed an appeal against the order of the District Forum, Hisar, directing the respondent-Bank to release the balance amount of the loan to the complainant unconditionally with liberty to purchase an I.S.I. mark electric motor from the open market. The appeal was filed beyond the prescribed period of 30 days under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the appeal was barred by limitation and dismissed it. The court found that the appellant had failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the appeal and had also violated the statutory requirement under Rule 8(4) of the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988, by not filing a separate application for condoning the delay along with an affidavit setting forth the facts on which it relied to satisfy the court that there was sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of limitation.

Issues: 1. Whether the appeal was barred by limitation? 2. Whether the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of limitation? 3. Whether the appellant was aggrieved by the order of the District Forum?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the appeal was barred by limitation as it was filed beyond the prescribed period of 30 days under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. 2. The court found that the appellant had failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the appeal and had also violated the statutory requirement under Rule 8(4) of the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988, by not filing a separate application for condoning the delay along with an affidavit setting forth the facts on which it relied to satisfy the court that there was sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of limitation. 3. The court held that the appellant was not aggrieved by the order of the District Forum as there was no stipulation in the loan agreement between the Bank and the complainant requiring that the electric motor was to be purchased from the appellant.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal as it was barred by limitation and the appellant had failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the appeal.

ORDER

Mr. Justice S.S. Sandhawalia, President—This appeal must necessarily fail against the preliminary bar of limitation. It is, therefore, wasteful to delve deeply into the merits of the case, and it would suffice to notice the salient facts pertaining to the question of limitation.

2. What first meets the eye is the somewhat unusual feature that the appellant — Haryana Agro Industries Corporation Limited (hereinafter called 'the Corporation') was not even remotely a party to the proceedings before the District Forum, Hisar. Therein the complainant-respondent Sh. Virender Pal Singh had preferred a complaint against the Saffidon Primary Co-operative & Land Development Bank, Saffidon (respondent No. 2). His primal grievance was that the aforesaid Bank was trying to indulge in an unfair practice by compelling him to purchase an electric motor to be installed in his tubewell, from the appellant-Corporation only and he sought the relief that the Bank be directed to release the balance amount of Rs. 9,000/- of the sanctioned loan for the purchase of a motor from a dealer or trader of his own choice. Despite the issuance of the notice, the respondent-Bank did not choose to put in appearance before the District Forum, and, consequently, the proceedings against it were ordered to be taken ex - parte. Relying upon the evidence of the complainant, the District Forum directed the respondent-Bank to release the balance amount of the loan to the complainant unconditionally with liberty to purchase an I.S.I. mark electric motor from the open market.

3. The order of the District Forum was passed way back on the 13th of August, 1990. The present appeal has been presented before this Commission on the 2nd January, 1991. The appellant has, thus, to explain satisfactorily a delay of nearly four months beyond the prescribed period of 30 days for preferring the appeal under Section of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). It may perhaps be said at the very outset that the appellant has singularly failed to do so.

4. In First Appeal No. 16 of 1990 (Haryana State Electricity Board through Executive Engineer, Operation Divn. No.1, Hisar v. Dinesh Kumar son of Sh. Bishan Sarup, Hisar), this Commission has already categorically held that the terminus a quo for the period of limitation under Section 15 runs from the date of the order and not from any supposed date of the receipt of the copy thereof under Rule 4(10) of the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules').

5. Now apart from the above, there are clear mandatory procedural requirements whenever the appeal is being presented beyond the period of limitation. It may be pointedly mentioned that on the appellant's own showing from the very first instance, they were well aware that the appeal was barred by time and a fragmentary prayer to condone the delay in the filing therein was made in the heading of the appeal itself. However, Rule 8(4) of the Rules provides as under: -

"(4) When the appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation as specified in the Act, the memorandum shall be accompanied by an application supported by an affidavit setting forth the fact on which appellant relies to satisfy the State Commission that he has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of limitation."

It is somewhat manifest from the plain language of the above-quoted sub-rule that herein there has been a frontal violation of the said provision. Even though the appellants were fully aware that the appeal was being presented after the expiry of the period of limitation, yet no separate application for condoning the delay was annexed thereto. What is more, admittedly, no affidavit as required by setting forth specifically the facts on which the appellant-Corporation wished to rely, to satisfy this Commission, that there was sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of limitation, was attach










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