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HARYANA STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES
REDRESSAL COMMISSION, CHANDIGARH
Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.S. Sandhawalia, President;
Mr. Tikka Singh, Member; Smt. Basanti Devi, Member
HARYANA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD—Appellant
versus
DINESH KUMAR—Respondent
First Appeal No. 16 of 1990—Decided on 4.2.1991
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant :Mr. Sanjay Bansal, Advocate.
For the Respondent:Mr. O.P. Sharma, Advocate.
The limitation period for appeals under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, begins from the date of the order of the District Forum and not from the date of receipt of a copy thereof communicated under Rule 4(10) of the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988.
Headnote:
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT - Limitation for Appeals - Terminus a quo - Whether from the date of the order or from the date of receipt of a copy thereof communicated under Rule 4(10) of the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988?
Fact of the Case:
The issue arose in a set of three appeals filed by the Haryana State Electricity Board against orders of the District Forum, Hissar, in consumer disputes. The appeals were filed beyond the prescribed period of 30 days under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The Board contended that the limitation period should run from the date of receipt of the order under Rule 4(10) of the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988, which requires the orders of the District Forum to be communicated to the parties free of charge.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the terminus a quo for determining the limitation period prescribed under Section 15 of the Act is firmly fixed on the date of the order of the District Forum itself and not from the date of receipt of a copy thereof forwarded under Rule 4(10) of the Rules.
Issues: Whether the limitation period for appeals under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, begins from the date of the order or from the date of receipt of a copy thereof communicated under Rule 4(10) of the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 15 of the Act categorically prescribes that the appeal is to be preferred within a period of 30 days from the date of the order. The language used is precise and unambiguous, fixing the terminus a quo from the date of the order and not from any other time. 2. Rule 4(10) of the Rules, prescribing for the communication of the order to the parties free of charge, cannot override the clear and inflexible terminus of the date of the order fixed by Section 15. Rules framed under an Act cannot possibly run counter to or supersede the parent statute itself. 3. The purpose of the Act and the Rules is the expeditious decision of consumer disputes, including appeals. Accepting the appellant's construction would defeat this purpose and lead to a constant flux of disputes and debates regarding the limitation period.
Final Decision: The Court allowed the appeals and condoned the delay in filing the appeals, holding that the appellant-Board had established sufficient cause for the non-filing of the appeals within the prescribed period.
Mr. S.S. Sandhawalia, President—Whether the terminus a quo for determining the period of limitation prescribed by Sec. 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, beings from the date of the order itself or from the date of the receipt of a copy thereof communicated under Rule 4(10) of the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988? This is the significant threshold question in this set of three closely connected appeals (First Appeal Nos. 16, 17 and 18 of 1990), all preferred by the Haryana State Electricity Board. This order will govern all of them.
2. The relevant facts giving rise to the issue aforesaid may be representatively noticed with relative brevity from First Appeal No. 16 of 1990 (Haryana State Electricity Board v. Dinesh Kumar). The respondent along with his father had jointly preferred a complaint before District Forum, Hissar, with regard to the excessive demands raised against him for electricity charges. The District Forum partly allowed the respondent’s claim and directed that the demand of Rs. 900/- be reduced with regard to the electricity consumed by two fans and the relevant bill amended accordingly. The order of the District Forum is dated the 25th July, 1990. The present appeal was filed before the Commission on the 21st September, 1990 and in the heading of the Grounds of Appeal it was mentioned that the order under appeal was received by the appellant on the 17th September, 1990.
3. Notice of the appeal was served on the respondent and inter-alia, a legal objection about the maintainability thereof was raised on his behalf on the ground of limitation. It was reiterated that the order under appeal being clearly dated 25th July, 1990, the filing of the present appeal on the 21st September, 1990 was grossly beyond the prescribed period of 30 days under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter called ‘the Act’). It was further pointed out that no reason has been given by the appellant for filing the appeal beyond the said period.
4. Faced frontally by the bar of limitation, Mr. Bansal, learned Counsel for the appellant, forcefully took up the stand that the period of limitation is to run not from the date of the order, but from the date of its communication under Rule 4(10) of the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 (hereinafter called ‘the Rules’). It was contended that the said rule in terms requires that the orders of the, District Forum shall be communicated to the parties free of charge. On that premises, it was submitted that the time begins to run from the date of the communication of the order, and not from the date when it is pronounced or signed by the District Forum. In the present case, a copy of the order having been received by the appellant on the 17th September, 1990, the appeal was claimed to be wholly within the prescribed period.
5. On the other hand, Mr. O.P. Sharma, learned Counsel for the respondent, firmly urged that Section 15 of the Act was categoric that the appeal has to be preferred within the period of 30 days from the date of the order, and this mandate cannot be overridden by the inference or implication of any subsidiary rule. This apart, firm reliance was placed on Rule 8 of the Rules, particularly prescribing for the procedure for hearing of appeals under Section 15 of the Act, and mandating vide sub-rule (3) thereof that each memorandum shall be accompanied by the certified copy of the order of the District Forum appealed against. Reference was further made to sub-rule (4), which prescribes that when the appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation, the memorandum of appeal shall be accompanied by an application, supported by an affidavit, setting forth the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the State Commission that he has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed period.
6. Undoubtedly the core question raised by the frontally opposed stand of the parties herein is of considerable signific
