The party seeking condonation of delay under the proviso to Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 must explain each day of default beyond the prescribed period of limitation.

Mr. Justice S.K.M. Lodha, President — The Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and the Divisional Manager, R.S.H.T.C, Bikaner who were opposite parties before the District Forum, Bikaner have filed this appeal under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (“the Act” herein) against the order dated 2.5.1991 passed in Complaint Case No. B/186/90. The District Forum dismissed the complaint so far as award of compensation and refund of fare were concerned. It, however, gave certain directions to the opposite parties-respondents which are (1) that the appellants should not allow more passengers than the capacity of the bus and it should not issue more tickets beyond it; (2) that the driver and the conductor should wear the dresses which have been provided by the R.S.R.T.C and certain in other directions contained in clause 1(c) of the order. The appeal was filed on 21.6.1991. Office reported that the appeal is barred by 20 days and even if the date of sending the certified copy by the opposite parties is taken into consideration it is still barred by 9 days. An application for condonation of delay was submitted with the appeal supported by affidavit of Shri S.K. Jaini, Divisional Manager, R.S.R.T.C, Bikaner. It may be stated that the affidavit has not been verified much less by a competent authority. The contents of the affidavit were not sworn by the deponent. As the affidavit companying the application was not duly verified a notice was issued to the appellant to show cause why this appeal be not rejected as barred by time.

2. On 9.8.1991 the Officer-in-charge prayed for time as the Counsel for the appellant has not come. The appeal was adjourned. The appeal has been listed today for considering the question of limitation in presenting the appeal. The certified copy of the order appealed against which was sent by the District Forum, Bikaner to the complainant on 13.5.1991 bears the/endorsement that the copy is being sent to the Divisional Manager for information and compliance. The copy was not issued to the appellants on their applications. In the application for condonation of delay it has been stated by the appellants that the appellants received the certified copy on 13.5.1991 and that on receipt of the certified copy, it was sent to the Standing Counsel of R.S.R.T.C. for his opinion but on account of his pre-occupations as well as the file being tagged with another file, the opinion of the advocate was only received on 4th June, 1991 and thereafter the file was sent to the Head Office, Jaipur alongwith opinion of the advocate. It was further stated in the application that in the meanwhile the staff became busy in the election duty and no decision was taken as to whether the appeal was to be filed against the order or not. In para 3 of the application it was stated that delay in filing the appeal which according to the appellants is of 9 days may be condoned in the circumstances mentioned in the application as well as on account of administrative exigency. The application is in two pages and in the margin S.K. Jaini, Divisional Manager has put his signatures. Towards the close of the application where the learned Counsel for the appellant has signed, Shri S.K. Jaini has not put his signatures. Be that as it may the application was not supported by a verified affidavit. It cannot be considered as an affidavit in support of the application as envisaged by Rule 8(4) of the Consumer Protection (Rajasthan) Rules, 1987.

3. Period of limitation prescribed under Section 15 of the Act is 30 days from the date of the order. Proviso to Section 15 of the Act lays down that if the State Commission is satisfied on sufficient cause being shown for presenting the appeal after the expiry of period of limitation, it can condone the delay. The two words used in proviso viz. “satisfied” and “sufficient cause” are the very same words which have been used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 or its predecessor Statute Limitati