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HARYANA STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES
REDRESSAL COMMISSION, CHANDIGARH
Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.S. Sandhawalia, President;
Mr. S. Kulwant Singh, Member
PAWAN KATIAL & ORS.—Complainants
versus
ANSAL HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION LTD., PANCHKULA—Opp. Party
and
PRATIBHA NAGPAL & ORS.—Complainants
versus
ANSAL HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION LTD., PANCHKULA—Opp. Party
Criminal Case Nos. 20 & 22 of 1992— Decided on 27.7.1992

Advocates:
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Complainants :Mr. H.S. Awasthi, Advocate.
For the Opp. Parties :Mr. B.R. Gupta, Advocate.

Headnote:(i) Law of Precedent - Question of Consumer jurisdiction qua promoter-builders and their allottees - State Commission bound by the considered decision rendered by the National Commission - It should not refuse to be so bound merely on the ground that an appeal has been taken against it to the Supreme Court This Commission continues to be bound by the precedents of the earlier orders of the National Commission on the point - Promoter-builder and allottees relationship constitutes a service as defined under the Act.

       Held: It is well-settled on the larger theory of precedent that ajudgment of a court holds the field and is binding on the courts below till it is expressly reversed or overruled by a larger Bench or a superior court. The mere filing of an appeal or the admission of a special1cave petition by their Lordships of the Supreme Court does not ipso facto obliterate its reasoning, or the ratio thereof. It is merely as yet put in issue hut is in no way wiped off the slate. Nor does the stay of a specific judgment whilst admitting the appeal against it (which is sometimes a matter of course), would be of any further significance in this context Such an order operates as a stay of the particular judgment. It cannot operate as a stay of the ratio, reasoning and the principle which forms foundation of that judgment till it is actually set aside and substituted by that of the appellate court. Were it to be otherwise, the situation in the well-ordered field of a legal system governed by precedent would be rendered chaotic. (Para 8)

       (ii) Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - Sections 2, 14 & 17 - Jurisdiction - Complaint against the builder-Promoter with regard to the increase in super area, charges for covered balcony, escalation charges, electric connection charges etc. etc. - Opposite Party is a promoter-builder - Agreement for the transaction made available at a late stage - Whether the consumer jurisdiction is ousted in a situation where the promoter-builder chooses to frame the ultimate agreement with its allottees in the phraseology of a leasehold between a proposed lessee and the lessor? - (No)

       Held, that the Act is a beneficent statute and particularly orientated against any hypertechnicalitics. The definitions of a consumer and a service are wide-rangingly drafted to grant relief to the larger class of consumers created thereby. Equitable consideration in its application is the more significantly relevant one as against the legalistic hair-splitting with regard to its applicability. It is well settled that the equity court will always pierce the veil of form in order to arrive at the real nature and substance of the transaction. In the basic case of U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (Housing & Development Board) v. Garima Shukla, the National Commission did not even remotely lay down that the promoter-builder relationship would turn on the legal niceties of the form in which the last agreement is couched. It went by the larger and broader consideration of judging the matter on the ground whether the opposite party was providing the service to the public with regard to housing by means of the acquisition of the land, development of sites, construction of houses thereon and later allotment of plots and houses to the public. That description fits the opposite party like a glove. Even otherwise, it has been shown above and concluded if para 29 that even the terms of the agreement were patent and unerring incidents of promoter- builder activity alone and wholly inconsistent with any landlord-tenant relationship. (Para 19)

       (iii) Pecuniary Jurisdiction - Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - Section 17 - Preliminary question of pecuniary jurisdiction has to be on the basis of its evaluation by the party which seeks relief by way of a plaint or a complaint Complainant evaluated the complaint within the bounds of rupees ten lakhs - State Commission empowered to entertain it. (Para 21)

       Result: Ordered accordingly.

       IMPORTANT POINTS

       1. A considered judgment of the National Commission does not cease to hold the field merely because a special leave petition is admitted against it by the Honble Supreme Court.

       2. The Consumer Jurisdiction is not ousted in a situation where the promoter-builder chooses to frame the ultimate agreement with its allottees in the phraseology of a leasehold between a proposed lessee and the lessor.

ORDER

Mr. Justice S.S. Sandhawalia, President — Whether the considered judgment of the National Commission would cease to hold the field, the moment a special leave petition is admitted against it by the Hon’ble Supreme Court? Whether the consumer jurisdiction is ousted in a situation where the promoter-builder chooses to frame the ultimate agreement with its allottees in the phraseology of a lease-hold betwixt a proposed lessee and the lessor? These are the two significant threshold questions in this set of two connected complaint Nos. 20 & 22 of 1992.

2. For the limited purpose of this order disposing of the preliminary jurisdictional objections raised by the opposite parties, it is unnecessary to delve deeply into the facts. It suffices to mention that M/s. Ansal Housing and Construction Limited on their own showing are part of a well reputed group of promoter-builder companies at the national level. According to the complainant, they advertised in ‘The Tribune’ dated 7th of February, 1989 for the sale of the show-rooms and office flats on free hold land in a scheme styled as Sampark Shopping-cum-office complex in City Centre at Panchkula vide Annexure C-1. The five complainants applied for the allotment therein and the project sale note given by the opposite party is Annexure C2. It is their case that the agreement for the transaction was not available at that time, and was made available only nine months after the applications alongwith initial deposits had been submitted. The commitment conveyed to the complainants by the opposite party was that the constructed spaces allotted to them were to be handed over in the month of October 1990, but possession infact was offered only in February 1992 and that too without water supply, sewerage and electricity. The opposite party by a letter dated the 26th of February, 1992 demanded enhanced price from the complainants from what they had agreed to and it is their case that a sum of Rs. 3,41,707.50p was claimed as the additional amount. Aggrieved thereby the present complaint has been preferred making a grievance with regard to the increase in super area, the charges for covered balcony, escalation charges, electric connection charges, delay in handing over possession and charging of interest and charges for Star Estate Services Private Limited. Reliance was placed on documents Annexure C-1 to C-9. (The representative facts are taken from complaint case No. 20).

3. On notice being issued the opposite party confined its reply to raising preliminary jurisdictional objections alone whilst craving leave to file a detailed parawise reply to the complaint on the 8th of June, 1992 after their disposal, if necessary. The relevant part of preliminary objection No. 1 deserves notice in extenso as under:—

“That this Hon’ble Commission does not have jurisdiction to try this case as the complainant herein is not a ‘consumer’ as defined under Section 2(1)(d) and the activity of the respondent as a ‘builder’ does not constitute a ‘service’ under Section 2(1)(o) as defined under the Consumer Protection Act.”

It is then the plea that whether the activity of a builder constitutes a service under the Act is a question pending consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the order passed by the National Commission in ‘Lucknow Development Authority v. M.M. Sud’ wherein the Supreme Court has stayed the operation of the order passed by the National Commission. It is stated that subsequently the National Commission by an order dated 24th of April, 1992 (Annexure R-1) has postponed the consideration of certain revision petitions.

4. The pecuniary jurisdiction of the Commission has been assailed on the ground that the aggregate quantum of relief on behalf of all the five complainants amounts to more than Rs. twelve lacs as per Annexure C-8, and thus beyond the prescribed limit of Rs. ten lacs.

5. A reply to the preliminary objections was filed on behalf of the complainants and the matter was argued by th


















































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