Mr. Justice S.K.M. Lodha, President—This appeal under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (“the Act” herein) has been filed by the opposite party-appellant against the order dated 26-7-1991 passed by the District Forum, Jhunjhunu in Complaint Case No. 48/91. By the impugned order the complainant-respondent was granted some reliefs. The appeal was presented on 23-9-1991. Office has reported that it is barred by 29 days. Office report is not contested. An application for certified copy of the order appealed against was submitted with the memo of appeal. It was countersigned by the OIC on 29-7-1991. A notice was issued to the appellant to show cause as to why the appeal be not rejected as barred by time. Mr. M.L. Vyas, learned Counsel has appeared on behalf of the appellant. He invited our attention to the application for condonation of delay submitted by the appellant alongwith the memo of appeal. Affidavit of Shri Surendra Pal Singh, Deputy Director, Rajasthan State Insurance and G.P.F., Jaipur was submitted in support of the appeal. The question arises whether the appellant has succeeded in making out a sufficient cause for presenting the appeal, after the expiry of the period of limitation. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 makes it clear that the material two expressions are “satisfied” and “sufficient cause”. Proviso to Sec. 15 of the Act is in pari materia with Sec.5 of the Limitation Act. Whatever meaning has been attributed to the two expressions over a long line of precedents has to be given lo the two expressions used in proviso to Sec. 15 of the Act.

2. It will serve no useful purpose to examine the question whether autonomous Board or a Corporation or the Department is on different footing than a private party under proviso to Sec. 15 of the Act.

3. In State of West Bengal v. The Administrator Howrah Municipality and Others AIR 1972 SC 7 the final court of the Country observed as under:—

“Mr. D. Mukerji, learned Counsel for the first respondent, is certainly well-founded in his contention that the expression “sufficient cause” cannot be construed too liberally, merely because the party in default is the Government. It is no doubt true that whether it is a Government or a private party, the provisions of law applicable are the same, unless the statute itself makes any distinction “

From the above it is clear that even a much larger and bigger body like the State be it the Central Government or a State Government is on no different footing than the private litigant for the purpose of condonation of delay against the bar of limitation. Further an autonomous Board or a Corporation being a much smaller and a compact body would obviously be even on a lower footing vis-a-vis the Central Government or the State Government. In the Bihar State Board of Religious Trust v. Ramashrey Prasad Choudhary (AIR 1977 Patna 272) it was held that The Bihar State Board of Religious Trust was not entitled to any different treatment than a private party. It is thus clear that the appellant-department is in the identical position of the private party and as such it is equally required to explain the delay for every day beyond the terminus line of limitation. It was held in (AIR 1962 SC 361) Ramlal and Others v. Rewa Coal Fields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361 which as under-

“....The context seems to suggest that “within such period” means within the period which ends with the last date of limitation prescribed. In other words, in all cases falling under Sec.5 what the party has to show is why he did not file an appeal on the last day of limitation prescribed. That may inevitably mean that the party will have to show sufficient cause not only for not filing the appeal on the last day but to explain the delay made thereafter day by day. In other words, in showing sufficient cause for condoning the delay the party may be called upon to explain for the whole of the delay covered by the period between the last day prescribed for filing the a