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HIMACHAL PRADESH STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES
REDRESSAL COMMISSION, SHIMLA
Honble Mr. Justice R.B. Misra,
President; Mr. V. Verma & Mrs. Pratima Malhotra, Members
TELECOM DISTRICT ENGINEER—Complainant
versus
C.L. ARORA—Opp. Party
Appeal No. 49 of 1992—Decided on 22.7.1993

Advocates:
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Complainant :Mr. D.C. Chaudhary, Advocate.
For the Opp. Party :Mr. C.L. Arora, Advocate.

Headnote:Consumer Protection Act, 1986· Sections 2 & 14 - Disconnection of telephone on non· payment of bill - Disconnection was without due notice· Order of District Forum directing reconnection cannot be faulted - Order found not complied with - Objection regarding non-joinder of General Manager as necessary party cannot be permitted to be taken at appellate stage when it was not taken before District Forum· Appellant is liable to restore telephone connection without reconnection charges and not to recover rental for the period when telephone remained disconnected.

       (Paras 2, 3, 4 & 6)

       Result: Appeal dismissed with cost Rs. 1,000-.

       IMPORTANT POINT

       When the disconnection of telephone on nonpayment of bill was without due notice, the order of Forum direction reconnection cannot be faulted.

       

ORDER

Mr. V. Verma, Member— By this order we dispose of Appeal No. 49/92 filed against the order dated the 23rd October, 1993, passed by the District Forum, Kangra at Dharamshala.

2. Shri C.L. Arora, respondent in the appeal was subscriber of telephone No. 2355 at Palampur ever since 1984. This telephone was disconnected by the appellant for reason of late payment of one bill issued in November, 1990. This is the only fact that stands admitted on record. The respondent in his complaint had averred that he had not received the bill hence delay in payment. From the perusal of the reply of the appellant placed before the learned District Forum, we find that this fact has not expressly been controverted. Moreover why the arrears of November bill were not collected through subsequent bills of December, 1990 or January and March, 1991, which were paid in time, has not been explained. In regard to the date of disconnection also there is no certainty. 1st February, 1991, claimed by the appellant to be the date from which the facility was withdrawn is not certain. To the counter that a charge of Re. 1/- only on account of cancelled private call booked from this telephone on 18.2.1991 and collected from the respondent vide bill dated the 11th March, 1991 there is no convincing explanation. There is also no positive averment that the telephone was disconnected after due notice as required under the Departmental rules. On point of facts, therefore, the order under appeal cannot be faulted because undeniably disconnection was not regular. The subsequent conduct of the appellant termed 'revengeful' by the learned District Forum, in our view, borders on gross high-handedness. The learned District Forum had vide its order dated the 25th April, 1992, directed the appellant to consider the case of reconnection within one month. There was no compliance. In fact appellant did not care to place any report before the learned District Forum till the final disposal of the complaint on October, 1992. It is also on record that the respondent was made to shuttle from pillar to post and had to carry on un-ending struggle, all in vain, for restoration of the telephone. We are saddened to note that the appellant, a public authority, declined to give the respondent an opportunity of personal hearing. Eventually, when the case was transmitted to the General Manager, the restoration was not recommended on un-reasonably flimsy ground, viz. past two defaults in timely payment of the department's charges way back in April, 1985 and February, 1986. Since the connection had been restored on each occasion on payment of reconnection charges, the lapses undeniably stood waived off. The waiver, therefore, constituted an estoppel.

3. The principal point stressed by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that under the Departmental regulations the General Manager, Himachal Pradesh Circle is the competent authority to order restoration after a lapse of six months period. And that since the above authority being the necessary party had not been arrayed the order is bad in law and hence unsustainable. In this connection he vainly tried to draw sustenance from I (1992) CPJ 388. We are afraid he is not on firm ground for the simple reason that an objection on the ground of non-joinder of necessary party ought to have been taken at the earliest opportunity, and this the appellant failed to do before the learned District Forum. It is thus late in the day to raise the objection at the stage of appeal. Even, otherwise the facts of the above authority are clearly distinguishable from these of the instant case.

4. In support of his objection to the award of cost amounting to Rs. 200/- the learned Counsel for the appellant relied on the order of Gujarat State Commission reported in I (1991) CPJ 675. We are afraid here too this authority does not help him, for the reason that it is based on altogether different set of facts & circumstances. On the contrary in the present case neither












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