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HARYANA STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES
REDRESSAL COMMISSION, CHANDIGARH
Hon‘ble Mr. Justice S.S. Sandhawalia, President;
Mrs. Basanti Devi & S. Kulwant Singh, Members
SENIOR SUPERINTENDENT POST OFFICES & ANR.—Complainants
versus
BALBIR SINGH—Opp. Party
F.A. No. 232 of 1993—Decided on 17.9.1993

Advocates:
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Complainants :Mr. I.S. Sidhu, Advocate.
For the Opp. Party :Mr. R.S. Sohata, Advocate.
`

Sections 6 and 48 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 confer absolute exemption from liability on the appellant-department for the delayed payment or delivery of a Money Order, unless it is occasioned by fraud or wilful act of a particular postal employee.

Headnote:

POSTAL SERVICES - DELAYED PAYMENT OF MONEY ORDER - LIABILITY - EXEMPTION - INDIAN POST OFFICE ACT, 1898 - SECTIONS 6 AND 48 - INTERPRETATION - CONSUMER JURISDICTION - DEFICIENCY IN SERVICE.

Fact of the Case:

The respondent sent Rs. 1,000/- by Money Order to his wife on 30th October, 1992, but it was delivered only on 16th January, 1993, due to inadvertence. The District Forum directed compensation of Rs. 1000/- only for the harassment caused to the respondent's wife.

Finding of the Court:

Sections 6 and 48 of the Indian Post Office Act confer absolute exemption from liability on the appellant-department for the delayed payment or delivery of a Money Order, unless it is occasioned by fraud or wilful act of a particular postal employee.

Issues: Whether Sections 6 and 48 of the Indian Post Office Act confer an absolute exemption from liability on the appellant-department for the delayed payment or delivery of a Money Order?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. Money-order is not a postal article within the meaning of Section 6 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898. 2. Section 48 of the Act expressly pertains to exemption from liability in respect of money-orders. 3. Clause (c) of Section 48 provides exemption from liability for accidental neglect, omission or mistake, by, or on the part of an officer of the Post Office, or for any other cause whatsoever, other than the fraud or wilful act or default of such officer. 4. The postal services are extended out and maintained by or under the law laid down in the Indian Post Office Act and any accidental neglect, omission or mistake resulting in the delayed payment of a money-order is exonerated from liability, barring exceptional case of a fraud or wilful act of employees of the department.

Final Decision: Appeal allowed. Order of the District Forum set aside and complaint dismissed.

ORDER

Mr. Justice S.S. Sandhawalia, President — Whether Sections 6 and 48 of the Indian Post Office Act confer an absolute exemption from liability on the appellant-department for the delayed payment or delivery of a Money Order? This is the core question in this appeal.

2. In view of the pristinely legal question aforesaid the facts pale into in-significant. These may therefore be noticed with utmost brevity. The gravamen of the respondent, Balbir Singh’s complaint was that on the 30th of October, 1992 he had sent Rs. 1,000/- by Money Order to his wife Jasbir Kaur at Hoshiarpur. However, the said money order was not delivered to the addressee till more than three months thereafter, on the 16th of January, 1993.

3. In defending the complaint the appellant-department candidly admitted the broad factual position. The sending of the Money Order was admitted. It was however pleaded with some candour that owing to inadvertence the payment thereof could only be made on the 16th of January, 1993.

4. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings the District Forum with total alacrity held that the respondent must be compensated for the harassment meted out to the respondent’s wife because of the delay in the payment of the Money Order and forthwith directed compensation to the tune of Rs. 1000/- only.

5. Mr. I.S. Sidhu, the learned Counsel for the appellant-department is a spritied argument had first contended and made submissions on the factual aspect. It was pointed out that as soon as the fact of the Money Order having not reached the addressee was brought to the appellants notice a prompt enquiry was made and the original Money Order being untraceable, a duplicate Money Order was forthwith issued and finally delivered to the respondent-consumer’s wife. It was the plea that in these circumstances there was no intentional delay and consequently no liability would fall upon the appellant.

6. As a question of law it was highlighted that the present case was not one of non-delivery altogether of the Money Order but merely of delayed delivery thereof. It was submitted that the relevant Clause (C) of Section 48 of the Indian Post Office Act is in express terms and covers the matter. It is the stand that this provision confers an absolute immunity in favour of the appellant on this score. Submission was that the services of the postal department were extended out as a matter of law on the statutory conditions made manifest under Sections 6 and 48 of the Indian Post Office Act and, therefore, no deficiency in such services could possibly be attributed to the department.

7. On the other hand Mr. R.S. Sohata learned Counsel for the respondent has primarily peggal himself on Section 3 of the Act. It was contended that the remedy under this beneficent statute are additional remedies altogether apart from the Indian Post Office Act. Reliance was placed on the exhaustive order of this Commission in I (1991) CPJ 273, Jagdamba Rice Mills v. Union of India, Ministry of Telecommunications.

8. There can possibly be no quarrel with the aforesaid submission of Mr. Sonata that the consumer jurisdiction provides an additional remedy super-added to all the existing ones and in no way in derogation of any other law for the time being in force. However, the question still remains whether this particular lis comes with the four corners of the consumer jurisdiction, however, wide-ranging it may be. Herein it is patent that the focal question is with regard to the services undertaken by the appellant-department and any patent deficiency therein. By now it is well settled that the postal services as its very terminology indicates would squarely comes within the definition of Services as defined in Clause (O) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 27 of the Act. It is true that postal service is not in terms enumerated as such within that definition. However, it comes squarely within the generic definition of a service of any description which is made available to potential users. The







































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