Mr. Justice S.K.M. Lodha, President— The question of limitation is involved in both the appeals. They were heard together. We consider it proper to dispose them of by a common order.

2. The complainant-respondent filed two complaints which were registered as Complaint Nos. 429/89 and 430/89 by the District Forum, Jaipur. Both the complaints were decided by the District Forum on 17.12.1990, and certain directions with regard to payment of interest were issued by the District Forum. Aggrieved the Opposite Party-appellant has lodged two separate appeals. Appeal No. 121/91 arises out of Complaint No. 429/89 and Appeal No. 125/91 arises out of Complaint No. 430/89. The appeals were filed on 21.2.1991 against the order dated 17.12.1990. Certified copies of the order appealed against have been submitted with the memo of appeal. The certified copies show that the application for copy were made on 21.12.1990. The date fixed for issuance of the copies was 2.1.1991. The copies were taken delivery of on 2.1.1991. Time spent in obtaining the certified copies is 13 days. Period prescribed for filing the appeal is 30 days from the date of order as provided in Sec. 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (“the Act” herein). As stated above both the appeals were filed on 21.2.1991. Office reported that they have been presented after 23 days of the expiry of the period of limitation. The memos of appeals were accompanied by the applications under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay supported by affidavit of Mrs. Manju Mathur, Additional Director of Insurance and G.P.F. Department Rajasthan Jaipur. The affidavits were sworn on 21.2.1991, the day on which the applications for condonation of delay were presented. We may at once mention that Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable for condonation of delay in filing the appeal under the Act. The applications ought to have been filed under proviso to Sec. 15 of the Act, which is of course in pari materia with Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. The deponent of the affidavit has stated that she is the officer incharge in the appeals. The orders appealed against were passed on 17.12.1990 and according to the appellant the order was supplied on 2.1.1991. There is no dispute that the appellant is entitled to 13 days as time spent in obtaining the certified copies of the orders. It may be mentioned at this stage that the orders were passed on 17.12.1990 whereas the applications for copy were made on 21.12.1990. The appellant is required to explain delay for 23 days. 19 days delay was caused even from the date of supply of the certified copies to the appellant as the certified copies were supplied on 2.1.1991.

3. The crucial words used in proviso to Sec. 15 are “sufficient cause” and “satisfied”. These words have also been used in Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Proviso to Sec. 15 of the Act has to be given the same meaning which has been attributed thereto over a long line of precedents under Sec. 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 and its predecessor statute of 1908. It was held in Ramlal and Others v. Rewa Coal Fields Ltd. (AIR 1962 SC 361) as under:—

“...The context seems to suggest that “within such period” means within the period which ends with the last date of limitation prescribed. In other words, in all cases falling under Sec. 5 what the party has to show is why he did not file an appeal on the last day of limitation prescribed. That may inevitably mean that the party will have to show sufficient cause not only for not filing the appeal on the last day but to explain the delay made thereafter day by day. In other words, in showing sufficient cause for condoning the delay the party may be called upon to explain for the whole of the delay covered by the period between the last day prescribed for filing the appeal and the day on which the appeal is filed.”

4. The Supreme Court in Bikram Dass v. Financial Commissioner and Others (AIR 1977 SC 2221) has succinctly held as follows: