Mr. Justice Lokeshwar Prasad, President— The present appeal, filed by the appellant, under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), is directed against order dated 6.9.2000, passed by District Forum No III in Complaint Case No. 403/2000 - entitled Shri Rohtash Pal Mehta v. Executive Engineer/AFO, Delhi Vidyut Board.

The facts, relevant for the disposal of the present appeal, briefly stated, are that the respondent Shri Rohtash Pal Mehta had filed a complaint averring that he had purchased property bearing No. A-51/A, Manak Vihar Extension, New Delhi on 23.7.1990 from one Shri Jarnail Singh, who was the registered consumer in respect of electricity connection, bearing No. 1514666. It was stated, in the complaint by the respondent, that the respondent had been paying the electricity bills in respect of that electricity connection regularly. Even the misuse charges, levied by the appellant, had been paid by the respondent, as stated by the respondent in the complaint. However, in November, 1999, the respondent received a bill for the consumption of electricity in respect of the above said electricity connection, amounting to Rs. 30,836/-. After the receipt of the above said bill, the respondent approached the office of the appellant and came to know that the above said bill was for the period from 11.4.1988 to 19.11.1991. The grievance of the respondent, in the complaint, was that the above said bill, raised by the appellant, was wrong, and the demand raised was illegal. It was prayed that the appellant be directed to withdraw the bill and restore the electricity connection which had been disconnected by the appellant.

The stand taken by the appellant, before the District Forum, was that misuse in respect of the above said electricity connection was reported by the meter reader on 29.1.1991 and on the basis of the above said report, misuse charges were levied three years prior to 29.1.1991 i.e. w.e.f. 29.1.1988.

2. The learned District Forum, vide impugned order, has held that the demand raised by the appellant, was barred by limitation and on the above ground, has passed the order being impugned in the present proceedings.

Feeling aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the present appeal under Section 15 of the Act.

3. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant at length on the question of admission of the present appeal and have also carefully gone through the documents/material on record. The order, being impugned in the present proceedings, was passed by the learned District Forum on 6.9.2000. In terms of the provisions contained in Section 15 of the Act, the present appeal should have been filed within a period of thirty days from the date of the order. However, proviso to the above section provides that the State Commission may entertain an appeal even after the expiry of the above said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that there was ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing the same within the above said period. The words ‘sufficient cause’, occurring in proviso to Section 15 of the Act are of utmost significance. As per settled law, culled out from various judicial decisions, the above expression ‘sufficient cause’, though deserves to receive a liberal construction, yet, a just and equitable balance has to be maintained between the right secured by the respondent as a result of the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and the injustice of depriving the appellant of adjudication of his grievances on the merits of his appeal for causes beyond his reasonable control, which means the cause is bona fide and beyond the control of the appellant. Though no hard and fast line can be drawn as to what affords ‘sufficient cause’ in a given case, yet, again as per settled law, any cause which prevents a person from approaching the Court within time is ‘sufficient cause’. In doing so, it is the test of a reasonable man in normal circumstances which has to be applied.

4. A