The central legal point established in the judgment is that the recovery of excess interest on a house building advance does not constitute a 'consumer dispute' under the Consumer Protection Act.

Mr. Justice Lokeshwar Prasad, President—The present appeal, filed by the appellant, under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) is directed against order dated 9.5.2001, passed by District Forum, Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi in Complaint Case No. OC/162/2001-entitled Mr. N.V.S. Prasada Sarma v. Union of India, Ministry of Railways.

2. The facts relevant for the disposal of the present appeal, briefly stated, are that the appellant Mr. N.V.S. Prasada Sarma had filed a complaint under Section 12 of the Act averring therein that the appellant, while in service, had taken a House Building Advance of Rs. 1,27,500/- in two instalments from the respondent on 10.7.1996 and 19.12.1996. It was stated that the amount of the House Building Advance, taken by the appellant, from the respondent was to be recovered from the salary of the appellant every month from July, 1996 onwards. It was stated that the appellant by utilising the House Building Advance, given to him by the respondent, had constructed a house at District Ranga Reddy, (Andhra Pradesh), as per the approved plan within the stipulated period and had also submitted a Completion Certificate to the respondent on 23.6.1998. It was stated that as per the terms and conditions of Advance, interest on the amount advanced as House Building Advance was to be charged @ 10% p.a. It was stated that the appellant took voluntary retirement from service from 31.1.2000 and the respondent recovered a sum of Rs. 71,600/- on account of principal and another sum of Rs. 40,992/- on account of interest.

3. The grievance of the appellant in the complaint filed by him before the District Forum, in nutshell, was that the respondent had charged excess interest of Rs. 8,198/- by charging interest @ 12.5% p.a. instead of 10% p.a. In the complaint, filed by the appellant, it was prayed that the respondent be directed to return the excess amount of Rs. 8,198/- together with interest @ 18% p.a. from 31.3.2000 i.e. the date of payment. The appellant had also claimed compensation and cost of litigation.

4. The learned District Forum vide impugned order has held the complaint filed by the appellant was not maintainable before a redressal agency, established under the Act and on the above ground has dismissed the complaint, filed by the appellant.

5. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the present appeal under Section 15 of the Act.

6. We have heard the appellant on the question of admission of the present appeal and have also carefully gone through the documents/material on record. On the basis of documents on record, it is not in dispute that the grievance of the appellant in the complaint, filed by him, before the District Forum in nutshell related to the recovery of excess amount of Rs. 8,198/- charged by the employer of the appellant on account of interest on the House Building Advance, given to the appellant while the appellant was in the service of the respondent. The same by no stretch of imagination can be treated or termed as a ‘consumer dispute’ because there is no element of hiring of service for consideration. The learned District Forum has rightly held that the respondent in the given facts was not a provider of service within the meaning of Section 2(1)(o) of the Act. In our opinion, in the given facts, the order being impugned in the present proceedings, passed by the District Forum, suffers from no infirmity so as to call for any interference by this Commission in exercise of its appellate powers. The present appeal filed by the appellant is, therefore, devoid of substance. The same merits dismissal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed in limine with no order as to costs.

7. However, before concluding, we would like to make it clear that the dismissal of the present appeal by the Commission will not operate to the prejudice of the appellant in the matter of pursuing any other remedy that may be available to him under any other law fo