The cause of action for a complaint arises from the date of the first repudiation of the claim, and subsequent reiterations of repudiation do not extend the limitation period.

Mr. Justice V.K. Agrawal, President—This appeal, under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, is directed against the order dated 15.3.2001 in complaint No. 4/2000 by the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Kanker, (hereinafter called the ‘District Forum for short) directing the appellant/insurer to pay Rs. 7,500/- with interest thereon.

2. The averments of the complainant stated in brief are that respondent No. 1 had purchased a buffalo on 20.5.1993 for Rs. 7,500/- and got it insured with the appellant through respondent No. 2. It was also averred that the said buffalo died on 20.8.1994. The complainant, therefore, intimated the death of the buffalo to the appellant/respondent No. 2, but the appellant/insurer did not pay the assured amount, hence the complaint. It was also averred that the cause of action arose on 2.2.2000 as the appellant/respondent No. 2 failed to intimate the complainant about the progress of the case despite his letter dated 2.2.2000.

3. The complaint was resisted by the appellant, mainly, on the ground that it was barred by limitation. It was averred by the appellant in the above context that the claim of the complainant was repudiated by its letter dated 7.3.1995 on the ground ‘No Tag, No Claim’. It was also averred that the tag of the deceased cattle and other relevant documents were never sent to the appellant. It was, therefore, prayed by the appellant that the complaint be dismissed.

4. The District Forum in the impugned order held that the cause of action arose on 2.2.2000 when the appellant issued a letter stating that the claim has been repudiated. It was, therefore, held that the complaint was not barred by limitation. It was ordered that the assured amount of Rs. 7,500/- with interest @ 12% per annum be paid by the appellant to the complainant/respondent No. 1.

5. The learned Counsel for the appellant/insurer mainly submitted that the complaint filed on 10.5.2000 and was time-barred. It was submitted that the buffalo died on 20.8.1994 and that the claim was initially repudiated by the appellant by its letter dated 7.3.1995. It was reiterated by their letter dated 9.2.2000. It was submitted that both the said letters were addressed to respondent No. 2 through whom the claim was being pursued by the complainant.

6. The main question that arises for consideration is, as to whether the complaint is time-barred?

7. As noticed earlier, the cattle of the complainant/respondent No. 1 undisputably, died on 20.8.1994. The complaint has been filed on 10.5.2000. The cause of action as averred in the complaint arose on 2.5.2000. The cause of action as averred in the complaint arose on 2.2.2000 when the complainant sent a letter regarding non-receipt of intimation about the disposal of his claim. It may be noticed in the above context that the District Forum has held that the cause of action has arisen on the date of letter of repudiation dated 9.2.2000 of the appellant. It appears that the claim has been allegedly lodged by the complainant/respondent No. 1 through respondent No. 2 Society, which financed the amount for the purchase of the buffalo in question. It also appears that the present appellant had addressed a letter dated 7.3.1995 to respondent No. 2 Society stating that the claim of complainant/respondent No. 1 has been rejected on the ground ‘No Tag, No Claim’. The reference of the said letter dated 7.3.1995 has again been given in the appellant’s letter dated 9.2.2000 which is also addressed to Manager of respondent No. 2, Society. The Manager appears to have acknowleged the letters dated 7.3.1995 and 9.2.2000. In fact, the letter dated 9.2.2000 also mentions that letter dated 20.2.1997 was also sent by the appellant regarding the repudiation of the complainant’s claim. However, a copy of the said earlier letter dated 20.2.1997 is not on record. In any case, it is clear that the repudiation of the claim by the appellant in their earlier letter dated 7.3.1995, was only reiterated by their