SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Article Pause Article
judgment-img

2008(1) CPR 318
J&K STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,
JAMMU
G.D. Sharma, President and Khalid Hussain Member
Bhagwan Dass Bhatia & Ors. —Appellants
versus
CEAT Financial Service Ltd. and Another —Respondents
Appeal No. 2882 of 2007
Decided on 11-1-2008

Advocates:
Counsel for the Parties:
For the Appellants:Mr. R.K. Bhatia, Advocate.
For the Respondents:Mr. Rajiv Bhushan, Advocate.

IMPORTANT POINT
Consumer complaint regarding non-payment of amount on maturity of deposit by finance company could not be dismissed on ground that company law board was already dealing with matter.

Headnote:Consumer Protection Act, 1986—Sections 3, 12 and 17—Act provides additional remedy which is not in derogation of any other law—Consumer complaint for non-payment of maturity amount of deposit—Dist Forum dismissed complaints upholding preliminary objection that company law board had been dealing with matter—Appeal—Failure to make payments was breach of contract for service and matter fell within ambit of the Act—Impugned order was liable to be set aside and matter remitted for decision on merits. (Para 3)

       Result: Appeal allowed.

ORDER

G.D. Sharma, President—Order dated 3.4.2007 passed by the learned Divisional Forum Jammu(hereinafter to be referred to as the Forum) has been taken in appeal herein. The Forum below has dismissed the complaint on the preliminary objection raised by the respondents to the effect that Company Law Board had been dealing with the matter in controversy and formulated the scheme regarding payment of the amount to the investors of the respondents herein and that scheme also covers the appellants herein. The order of the Forum has been challenged on following grounds:-

(i) Section 3 of the J&K Consumer Protection Act 1987(hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) provides additional remedy which is not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. The jurisdiction of the Divisional Forum does not stand automatically ousted merely because of passing of an order or issuance of a direction by the Company Law Board regarding the affairs of respondent No.1.

(ii) The appellants herein were not a party in those proceedings before the Company Law Board and the orders passed by the Board for fixation and re-fixation of the schedule of payment were passed at their back.

(iii) The Forum has wrongly placed reliance on the judgment of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission which has no application to the facts of the present case. 2. Heard the arguments.

3. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents has placed reliance upon the decision of the National Commission rendered in the case of Allianz Capital and Management Services Ltd. v. B.P. Grover and Ors.1 The Forum has also relied upon this decision. From a bare perusal being made of the above said judgment it appears that Hon’ble Commission has not laid down any principle of law therein, but stopped hearing the case any further because the Company Law Board was seized of the matter. Adverting to the facts of the present case we find that the complaint was brought before the Forum under the provisions of the J&K Consumer Protection Act which under Section 3 provides an additional remedy to seek the relief. The proceedings pending before the Company Law Board are not bilateral between the parties of this case. The appellants had deposited the specified amounts under a contract where under the respondent No.1 had taken a liability to pay them the interest accrued thereon and return we deposits along with interest at the respective dates of their maturity. In case there is a breach of duty in providing that facility or service that amounts to deficiency in service as contemplated under the Act. The Company Law Board is a specially created tribunal under the relevant Act which does not have the jurisdiction in respect of the contract separately entered by the appellants with the respondent No. 1 herein. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants in order to buttress his contention has cited the case of Kishori Lal v. Chairman ESI Corporation.2 The Apex Court in this case has dealt with the term Service as defined under section 2(1)(o) of the Act and has held that the defamation is not restrictive. Only such services are excluded which are rendered free of charge-or under-contract of personal services. The following observations made by the Apex Court are reproduced:

“The expression contract of personal service in the exclusionary part of Section 2(1)(o) excluded the services rendered by an employee to his employer under the contract of personal service from the ambit of the expression ‘Service’. There is a distinction between a ‘contract of service’ and ‘contract for service’. A ‘contract for service’ implies a contract whereby one party undertakes to render service e.g. professional or technical service, to or for another in the performance of which he is not subject to detailed direction and control and exercises professional or technical skill and uses his own knowledge and discretion, whereas a ‘contract of service’ implies rel





Click Here to Read the rest of this document

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top