IMPORTANT POINT
Time spent in pursuing a remedy not permitted by law does not constitute sufficient cause.

Vinay Kumar, Member—This appeal arises out of decision of the UP State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in a Misc. Petition as well as Execution Petition in CC No.10 of 1998. The Consumer Complaint was decided by the State Commission allowing the complaint seeking compensation against the OPs.

2. In the execution proceedings, arising from it, OP/Om Shipping Agencies, filed an application for recall of the judgment passed in the Consumer Complaint. In the State Commission, consideration of the main consumer complaint, filed on 12.2.1998, had proceeded ex-parte against the OP. Hence, an application was filed for recall of the order. On 13.3.2007, the State Commission dismissed the application for recall of the judgment and order of 14.7.2005 and decided to proceed with the execution case.

3. The appellants/OPs, have moved this Commission to set aside the impugned judgment and order of 14.7.2005 passed in CC No. 10 of 1998. The appeal, having been filed after rejection of the review application, was filed in this Commission on 11.4.2007. Therefore, a period of 21 months lies between the impugned order and the appeal, which needs an explanation. Under Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, a period of thirty days only, from the date of the order, is allowed for filing of appeal before the National Commission. The Section however, permits the National Commission to “entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period”. We have perused the application for condonation of the long delay of 20 months. The case of the appellant is that he was ex-parte in the proceedings before the State Commission and therefore, came to know of the impugned order of 14.7.2005 only when a legal notice was received from the other party, M/s. Prabhat Exports on 6.2.2006. His counsel inspected the record on 27.2.2006 and discovered that an ex-parte judgment had been passed against them. On 27.3.2006 an application was moved before the State Commission for recall of the ex-parte judgment. The State Commission considered and rejected the same on 13.3.2007.

4. We do not see any merit in this explanation. For adjudication of disputes coming within its purview, the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 clearly prescribes the fora, before whom such disputes can be agitated. In the present case the jurisdiction of the State Commission was invoked and therefore, the next course available to the party aggrieved by the decision of the State Commission, was to move an appeal before the National Commission, under Section 19 of the Act. The Act does not give power to the State Commission to review its own decision. Therefore, even if it is accepted that the appellant came to know about the impugned order on 6.2.2006, immediately thereafter his appeal should have been filed before this Commission. The time spent by the appellant between 6.2.2006, when he claims to have learnt about the existence of the impugned order and 11.4.2007, when his appeal was actually filed before this Commission, was spent in seeking a remedy not permitted by the Act. Therefore, it cannot be said that he has ‘sufficient cause’, within the meaning of Section 19 of the Act. The appeal is therefore, liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation alone.

5. The appellant had sought permission to amend memorandum of appeal, which is allowed on 28.9.2008. While in the original appeal the prayer was to set aside the order of the State Commission dated 14.7.2005, in the amended appeal it was extended to seek quashing of the order of 13.3.2007 as well. In the first, the main consumer complaint was decided and in the second the application to set it aside was rejected. It is quite obvious that the underlying purpose is to circumvent the problem of limitation arising from the date of the order of 14.7.2005. We do not permit it, for reasons already recorded.

6. We have