IMPORTANT POINT
Anything and everything said to bridge up a yawning gap of delay is not to be termed as legitimate explanation for condoning delay

ORDER

This revision has been filed under Section 58(1)(b) of The Consumer Protection Act, 2019 in challenge to the Order dated 16.02.2021 of The State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Punjab in Misc. Application No. 1773 & 1774 of 2020 in F.A. No. 284 of 2020 arising out of the Order dated 09.12.2019 of The District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Mansa, in C.C. No. 117 of 2019.

2. Heard the learned counsel at admission. Perused the material on record, including inter alia the District Commission’s Order dated 09.12.2019, the State Commission’s impugned Order dated 16.02.2021, the application for condonation of delay before the State Commission, the memorandum of appeal before the State Commission and the petition before this Commission.

3. The District Commission vide its Order dated 09.12.2019 has partly accepted the complaint and directed the opposite party, the HDFC bank, to refund the amount of Rs. 87,375/- which was charged from the complainant for certain unauthorised transactions, along with Rs. 10,000/- as compensation and Rs. 5000/- as cost of litigation.

4. The bank appealed before the State Commission. The State Commission vide its impugned Order dated 16.02.2021 dismissed the appeal on limitation.

5. A perusal of the record shows that this is a matter in which a delay of total 274 days (195 days excluding the lockdown period) in filing the appeal before the State Commission was sought to be condoned in order to overcome the hurdle of the statutory period of limitation which bars the filing of appeal with such delay without sufficient cause. The submission of the learned counsel, who has tried to further reduce the period of delay on the basis of relaxation which has been granted by Hon’ble Apex Court in the perspective of the COVID-19 situation, is that, according to him, on that reckoning the period of delay should be taken as 66 days instead of 195 days. Though we do not wholly agree with such submission but even on its own admission the appeal was filed with delay of 66 days in the State Commission.

6. Be that as it may, ordinarily we tend to adopt a liberal approach on the aspect of considering the point of condonation of delay and lean to take an indulgent view towards the side who seeks such condonation. It is for the reason that we prefer that a matter be decided on merits rather than closed at the threshold stage i.e. on the ground of delay but that does not imply that we may ever ride roughshod over the statutory requirement regarding the law of limitation wherever it has been provided by the legislature in its wisdom. It does not need much elaboration to state that when the period of limitation expires it simultaneously gives rise to a right which accrues to the other side and the other side cannot be divested of its accrued right for no adequate reason, that is why, whenever there is a delay, and whenever condonation on that aspect is sought, by either side, it has to discharge the onus of showing such factual basis from which may emanate the convincing grounds relying upon which such delay may be condoned. It goes without saying that such explanation has to be genuine and not an explanation just for the sake of explanation. Anything and everything said to bridge up a yawning gap of delay is not to be termed as legitimate explanation, which has to be sincere, honest and persuasively adequate and worthy of credence.

7. The perusal of the impugned Order passed by the State Commission shows that it has considered the whole matter in detail and has examined this aspect not in any casual manner but with diligence and application of mind. It has not only examined the entire factual backdrop relevant to this aspect of delay but has also duly considered the explanations proffered on behalf of the appellant (the petitioner herein) in that regard. The relevant law has also been kept in perspective and a well-reasoned order has been passed disallowing the application for condonation of delay. We, in